Journal of Administration Overseas

VOLUME XIX · NUMBER 2
APRIL 1980

price £1.35 quarterly net
annual subscription including postage £5.94

OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION · HMSO

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Published by
HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE
49 High Holborn, London WC1V 6HB
13a Castle St, Edinburgh EH2 3AR
41 The Hayes, Cardiff CF1 1JW
Brazennose St, Manchester M60 8AS
Southey House, Wine St, Bristol BS1 2BQ
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80 Chichester St, Belfast BT1 4JY
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Price £1.35 net, annual subscription including postage £6.06

Journal of Administration Overseas

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ISBN 0 11 725552 1
ISSN 0021 - 8472

Editor's Notes

In this issue, British aid to Housing in the Third World is evaluated and India, Thailand Nigeria and Zambia are each the subject of individual study.

Roy Gilbert shows how Site and Service Schemes now constitute the priority housing component of ODA's (formerly ODM's) aid strategy, and he goes on to suggest that the Ministry should *inter alia*: make a more positive effort to promote such schemes; encourage the participation of volunteers in these schemes; undertake a study into home ownership capacity and aspirations in selected countries.

Gatian Lungu sets out very clearly and frankly, a major problem facing many newly independent countries: localize your personnel; promote on merit – the commonly accepted objective in *principle* of most Public Services, but not nearly so straight forward as it sounds – certainly not in Zambia where Lungu notes a clearly discernible weakening in the merit principle.

Thomas Morgan in the first part of his article on an Agricultural Centre in Thailand finds that the Centre's institutional role was initially one of a promoter of schemes rather than as a 'performer', with, in the author's view, rather too much emphasis given to the private sector.

James and Reddy examine post-independence legislation in India aimed at enforcing the abolition of untouchability with the manifest injustices and the abrogation of human rights which untouchability has involved. The authors found insufficient will in the Executive of Government to implement a somewhat improved law; too much legal ambiguity; too mild a punitive system.

Don Okpala looks at the problem of increasing the use of local materials in Nigerian house-building, thereby reducing costs *and* reducing the quantum of foreign imports – and he shows how difficult it is to get popular acceptance of traditional or neo-traditional methods, and to ensure that locally produced materials are of a lasting quality that compares in price and durability with modern cement and concrete based edifices.

An Evaluation of British Housing Aid provided by The Ministry of Overseas Development

ROY T GILBERT*

Introduction

When this study was commissioned, the terms of reference called for special attention to be given to site and service schemes and housing for low-income groups. Accordingly, half of the present report is specifically devoted to these aspects of housing while the emphasis throughout is upon projects aimed at the low income sector of the populations in developing countries.

Attentions must be drawn to the fact that this report is the outcome of a desk-study of Ministry of Overseas Development (ODM) files and other secondary sources of information, so that is does not allow precise conclusions to be drawn about particular projects. The aim of this study has, therefore, been to undertake a review of ODM housing aid as a whole since 1968 and to draw some general conclusions which provide a basis and a context for more detailed examination.

Thus, Section One, presents an overall picture of aid for housing from 1968 to the present, while Section Two attempts to identify the type of projects that lie behind the aggregate figures. The last two Sections look specifically at site and service schemes and housing projects for low income groups respectively, and examine ODM's performance in financing these kinds of project. Finally, the conclusions of the study are brought together at the end of the report where specific recommendations are made which it is hoped will enable ODM to give more help for the poorest in the form of housing.

ODM Housing Aid Since 1968

During the last decade, something of the order of £60 millions[1] has been spent on a wide range of housing projects in many countries. Indeed, the diversity of projects which will be examined in the next Section, reflects the fact that this sum comprises a heterogeneous collection of individual projects rather than a housing programme as such. This somewhat

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[1] In current prices. Allowing for inflation over the period since 1968 would lead to a figure of about £125 millions in 1977 prices.

complicates an evaluation procedure because housing projects in a particular country form an integral element of a bilateral aid relationship determined by many other factors than simply housing criteria. Nevertheless, subject to this constraint, this Section will look at housing aid as a whole in relation to overall policy aims for the sector.

First of all, the housing sector is an important one given that some £60 millions of aid has been committed to it since 1969, 6.4% of total project aid commitments during the period. The annual figures in Tables 1 and 2 however, demonstrate that its importance has declined.

Table 1: Commitments and Gross Disbursements of UK Project Aid to Housing. 1969-1976 (£ thousands in 1977 prices)

Total for Housing Projects:	*1969*	*1970*	*1971*	*1972*	*1973*	*1974*	*1975*	*1976*
— Committed	7,089	7,977	3,416	16,817	8,423	2,986	4,519	2,113
— Disbursed	6,672	4,266	7,942	7,891	10,040	6,571	8,276	6,765

Sources: 'British Aid Statistics' Vols 1969-73 and 1972-76.

Notes: (a) Owing to a new, more rigorous project classification system introduced in 1974, the fall in the totals from that year onwards may be partly for statistical reasons.

(b) Funds 'committed' refer to commitments made in that year, but the disbursement is not expected to be fully incurred in that same year. Indeed, it may be some years before a commitment to a project is fully disbursed. For this reason a commitment must not be misunderstood as a budget figure for a particular year.

(c) Includes Commonwealth Development Corporation.

Commitments to housing projects have varied widely from year to year, but on average are higher before 1974 than in the years since then. While the new project classification system introduced in that year probably helped to reduce the number of projects considered as belonging to the housing sector, this does not fully explain the sharp drop recorded.[2]

There has, in fact, been a significant decline in commitments to housing over the period.[3]

[2] The significance of the fall in real terms is even greater than the drop in the normal value during a period of inflation. In fact, over the study period 1968-1978, wholesale prices have risen by about 200% in the United Kingdom, meaning that an equivalent sum is worth three times more at the beginning than at the end. For the purposes of this study, differences between UK and aid recipients' inflation are presumed accounted for by exchange rate adjustments.

[3] The exceptionally high amount of £16.9 millions in 1972 was due to the Viaduct Housing Scheme in Gibraltar which alone accounted for £6 millions. Otherwise commitments in Gibraltar, the main recipient of ODM housing aid, have been fairly evenly spread over the period and so do not appreciably affect the falling trend recorded.

The fall in commitments, being a statement of intent about future spending, can be understood as a policy change. Disbursements, on the other hand, are incurred during the implementation of a project and reflects commitments only after a time lag. From 1960 to 1972, commitments were greater, while they were exceeded by disbursements from 1973 onwards. However, the current high level of disbursements can only be maintained for a short period until all the previous commitments which sustained them have been used up.

Table 2: Housing Projects as a Proportion of Total UK Project Aid. 1969-1976

% of all Project Aid in Housing:	*1969*	*1970*	*1971*	*1972*	*1973*	*1974*	*1975*	*1976*
— Committed	11.2	11.7	3.1	12.1	5.5	2.4	4.1	1.3
— Disbursed	10.3	6.7	7.7	7.9	9.5	6.0	6.9	5.3
Total Project Aid:	(£ millions in current prices)							
— Committed	63.5	67.9	110.2	138.7	152.1	124.9	111.2	166.6
— Disbursed	64.9	67.9	103.2	99.4	105.2	109.9	119.9	131.0

Sources:)
Notes:) see Table 1.

Having accounted for between 10.3% and 5.3% of all project spending over the period makes housing an important sector for aid. Nevertheless, the decline in its share, especially of commitments, would indicate that it is becoming less important in the total aid strategy; but why is that so?

In fact, over the study period, the development of housing aid policies more clearly in favour of low income groups can help explain the fall. Already by 1968, appeals were being made for 'genuinely low cost housing' in face of the growing expense of what were intended to be cheap houses for low income families in ODM projects. Also, concern was being felt that the beneficiaries of ODM housing projects were predominantly the higher income groups in developing countries. For these reasons, proposals were already being made in 1969 for supporting site and service projects to provide plots with basic infrastructure, requiring the occupant to build his own house to an appropriate standard. This idea was further refined until it became the priority housing aid category indicated in the 1975 White Paper, 'More Help for the Poorest . . .'[4], which guides ODM's thinking on the way it can best use its funding to assist the lowest income groups in developing countries. In that document, full backing is given to site and service schemes as the top priority for the housing sector, although the sector itself is not considered among the most important for aid.

[4] UK Ministry of Overseas Development. The Changing Emphasis of British Aid Policies: More Help for the Poorest, Cmd 6270 HMSO, London, October 1975. See: Paragraphs 14-20.

At the same time, there was a growing criticism of the use of aid funds to finance housing for high income groups (including civil servants) to whom it might be rented at a subsidized rate. This kind of housing, which had figured significantly in aid, was therefore coming under closer scrutiny from 1968 while greater support was being given to the idea of site and service schemes as the correct priority.

This changing emphasis has had some effect in reducing the amount of aid going to high income housing. For example, since 1975, no higher income housing project, except for the special case of Gibraltar[5], has been presented to the Projects Committee which is responsible for examining all major projects.

There has been a sharp fall in the commitments to higher income housing projects, while housing for low income groups, including site and service schemes, has attracted a small but steadily growing commitment. It can be argued that this situation reflects a response to policy developments in favour of the lower income groups. While the move away from financing higher income housing has been encouraging, the expansion of aid for housing lower income groups has been only modest and leaves much room for improvement. Exactly why site and service schemes in particular have failed to expand will be one of the key issues dealt with in Section Three.

To complete the introduction to housing aid in general, it is necessary to look at where housing projects are being financed in order to identify the respective recipient countries. The main ones are listed in Table 3.

Table 3:
Countries with the highest ODM aid for housing and related projects. Average 1974-mid 1977
(£'s current prices)

Country	*Total Commitment per annum*
Gibraltar	1,086,561
Lesotho*	657,493
Malawi	474,211
Gilbert Islands and Tuvalu	356,104
Botswana	332,934
Solomon Islands	328,499
Swaziland	137,268
Mali*	134,286
Seychelles	65,000

Source: ODM Statistical Division (see Annex 1).

Note: *indicates that projects are almost exclusively concerned with ancillary services of water supply and sewerage and not with the housing unit itself.

[5] Some £11.4 millions have been committed to housing projects in Gibraltar since 1968. It was reported that the very low rents and high building costs prevailing in the colony make it uneconomic for private enterprise to build housing. Although space standards have been kept 20% below those of UK council housing, their £5,000 to £12,000 unit cost means that they cannot be considered as being in the category of low income housing for developing countries.

More aid money, some 20% of the total since 1968, has been committed to housing in Gibraltar than to housing in any other country, reflecting its special political position that was mentioned earlier, so that it remains the principal recipient of ODM housing aid. Lesotho, in second place, is also a rather special case for a different reason as the large commitment was taken up by an allocation for the Maseru Sewerage System. In the Gilbert Islands and Tuvalu, as well as the Solomon Islands, housing costs have been at a similar level to those found in Gibraltar, and even flats aimed at labourers have been built at a relatively high cost.

Thus Malawi, Botswana, Swaziland and the Seychelles, all countries in or near the Southern Region of Africa, constitute the main recipients of ODM housing aid aimed at low income groups. As such, these cases will be examined in more detail in the following two Sections of this report.

Table 4:

Countries with the highest ODM aid per capita per annum for housing and related projects. Average 1974-mid 1977

(£'s current prices)

Country	*Commitment per capita per annum*
Gibraltar	37.47
St Helena	12.13
Gilbert Islands and Tuvalu	6.72
Solomon Islands	1.73
Seychelles	1.14
New Hebrides	1.10
Lesotho*	0.54
Botswana	0.50
Dominica	0.43

Source:)
Note:) see Table 3.

The figures for housing aid per capita highlight ODM's greater participation in this sector in the dependent territories, namely Gibraltar, St Helena, the Gilbert Islands and Tuvalu, and the Solomon Islands which have the highest aid per inhabitant. In these small territories, ODM financed housing has had a major impact, but it has often been of a very high standard and has had little to do with the aim of helping to house the poor. Instead, it is a reflection of the kind of responsibility that is felt towards the colonies.

The country with the highest per capita aid that is primarily directed towards low-cost housing is the Seychelles. This country, together with Botswana with the second highest low income housing figure for an independent aid receiver, are places where the aid financed projects will have had the greatest impact upon the housing situation of the country as a whole. Although Malawi counted as one of the main aid receivers in Table 3, the impact of housing aid has been considerably dissipated among the nation's five million inhabitants, amounting to only 9p per capita per annum over the period in question.

To sum up the argument so far, it should be re-stated that housing aid is an important component of project aid as a whole, but that its importance has declined since 1968. The fall has been due to a significant reduction in finance for high income housing and failure to increase support for low income housing (including site and service schemes) sufficiently to offset a downward trend for the total. The limited number of low income housing projects have been mostly planned and implemented in independent countries. Just why there have not been more such projects will be left to the discussion on site and service schemes in Section Three.

ODM Housing Projects

As has already been mentioned, the aggregate figures for housing do not correspond to a Housing Aid Programme as such, but rather comprise a collection of miscellaneous projects. This Section will try to give the general review more meaning by explaining the variety of projects that make up housing aid as a whole.

This diversity is first of all evident in the different income levels of the intended beneficiaries of housing projects. Senior Government officials and expatriate professional staff (teachers, doctors, etc) are examples of those with higher incomes who have benefited from housing aid especially in the dependent territories. While the standards vary a lot, those implied for such housing by the cost per unit tend to be high, and are not related to the overall standards prevailing in the country concerned.

Furthermore, many Governments have a policy of providing accommodation to their civil servants at a low, subsidized rent. Although projects for this kind of housing are still being financed, ODM support for subsidized housing has declined as policy has clearly shifted in favour of lower income groups.

High standard housing is still supported, however, in connection with technical assistance programmes in countries such as Tanzania and the Sudan where adequate accommodation is not available for the professional personnel and their families. While it is beyond the present study to comment upon technical assistance programmes as such, it ought to be pointed out that in these cases, the capital outlay for housing will considerably increase their costs.

Sectoral aid projects, say, in education, health and public administration may also include a housing component of quite a high standard. When a school is built in a remote area, for example, the project invariably makes some provision for staff housing. The same is true of hospitals and health centres. Police housing also figures significantly in this category. Even when aimed at relatively junior staff, such housing can in no way be considered as meeting the needs of the lowest income groups.

In a similar way, it may be difficult to separate out the housing component of a general development project such as land reclamation, irrigation or urban development. Recent examples include the Mahaweli Development Project in Sri Lanka which included some rural housing units and also the Lobatse Physical Development in Botswana, and the Belmopan new capital city of Belize. In these cases the housing standards correspond to the income levels of the people whom the project was aimed at.

In addition, separate housing projects have been aimed specifically at low income groups but with only limited success. Their continually rising costs and inappropriate standards gave rise to the emphasis upon site and service projects, a limited number of which have been already financed by ODM. As these two kinds of housing aid are the subject of the special attention of this report, they are examined in more detail in the following two Sections.

Finally, two other kinds of work on housing in developing countries by bodies related to ODM should be mentioned. Firstly, the Commonwealth Housing Corporation Ltd, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Commonwealth Development Corporation, also finances housing projects. In spite of the CHCL's interest in supporting housing for low income groups, their commercial requirement to ensure the financial viability of the project encourages them to stay 'up-market', away from low-income groups whose economic circumstances cannot provide adequate security for a long term commercial investment. Another way in which the CHCL gives support to housing for higher income groups is through its encouragement to financial institutions such as building societies through the provision of seed capital.

Secondly, the Overseas Division of the Building Research Establishment, financed by ODM, undertakes basic research into building technologies which are directly relevant to housing in developing countries, although no case could be found where these have been applied directly in ODM aid projects. Research into building materials derived from soil stabilization technologies and alternative sewerage systems are potentially relevant to the implementation of site and service schemes, while the development of the BREKIT building system, an offshoot of the more complex BRECAST system, could offer new possibilities for low income housing. Nevertheless, the emphasis upon basic research appears to have isolated the work done at the BRE's Overseas Division from the 'More Help for the Poorest' aid strategy of ODM. This is not to say that research being undertaken is not relevant, but that its relevance has not been appreciated and hence it has not been applied to that strategy.

From this brief examination of the components of housing aid, it is clear that site and service schemes and housing for low income groups are two relatively small components of a wide variety of projects that make up aid to the sector. Being the main concern of the present study, it is to these two that the discussion now turns in more detail.

Site and Service Schemes

The provision of a site with some services for the occupier to build a house for his family is the basic characteristic of schemes which now constitute the priority for housing assistance with UK capital aid. But in site and service schemes, one is dealing with a heterogeneous category not only inasmuch as the degree of services can vary, but also the function implied by the concept itself is not unique.

In the context of aid to developing countries, site and service schemes have been seen by ODM (and also the World Bank) as a means of providing the basic infrastructure so that those in lower income groups who can afford to, are able to build their own housing unit.

Such schemes are seen, therefore, as an alternative to haphazard squatting through the development of what may be called 'legalized spontaneous settlements'. They may vary from simply consisting of a series of demarcated sites with minimal services[6] to sites that are individually connected to mains water and sewerage systems and electricity, as well as having a ready-built core unit of a single-room with a separate WC and kitchen.

Whatever the difference in the standard of services, all schemes have in common the characteristic that they confer upon the occupier of the site, whether he be freeholder or leaseholder, the legal right and obligation to construct his own shelter. They, therefore, imply a self-help approach to housing, where the occupier remains responsible, within certain limits, for the building of the housing unit even though informal contracting arrangements may be involved. Experience of ODM financed schemes in Southern Africa has shown that people do find the means and resources, especially of time, to build and that women have a big role to play.

A site and service scheme is, therefore, an extension of the home ownership concept to lower income groups as occupiers are expected to buy materials (and repay the necessary loans) to build the house that they will own. It therefore becomes necessary for the occupier to build up capital, the value of which may be extremely high in relation to his or her income. A site and service scheme will, therefore, only be successful if the occupier/builders are able and willing to build up such equity, clearly not a commitment that is likely to appeal to the lowest income groups. Even if they could afford to do so, some families might wish to make alternative investments such as in livestock and consumer durables which they might consider more appropriate and lucrative.

A site and service scheme itself might, in some circumstances, provide a commercial option for someone to build the house and then rent it entirely, or in part, to somebody else. Such an arrangement, far from being considered an abuse, ought to be regarded as one of the many ways a site and service scheme can be developed.

All these options are feasible alternatives for such schemes, but whenever appraising a site and service scheme, it is important to assess the home ownership commitment to determine whether the building programme is likely to be successful and which income group is likely to benefit from it. Even with a strong economic commitment to ownership, a site and service scheme should only be considered as a partial contribution to low income needs. Consideration should always be given also to the provision of some low income housing for rent to those unable or unwilling to take upon themselves the home ownership commitment.

Where building begins, the dependence upon individual initiatives can lead to very uneven development and has led to site and service schemes being criticized on aesthetic grounds and Governments to conclude that they offer second class housing. But such remarks often miss the point that a site and service scheme, once implemented, may be complete as far as

[6] 'Minimal Services' might constitute an individual pit latrine for each site and communal water supply, either by standpipe or well for each twenty-five plots, say.

the capital aid project is concerned, but it is, in fact, a very incomplete building site upon which building operations may take place over the long term as families build up equity. Even so, in some cases, very attractive houses may be built on the sites.

In spite of the priority given to site and service schemes in ODM housing aid, only some eight projects have been supported, although they have provided over 11,000 plots for housing since 1969, over four times the number of low income housing units that have been built. All but one of these projects are in Southern Africa. The reason for this geographical concentration is not clear although it must be noted that interest in financing site and service schemes has been expressed in countries in other regions of the world, but projects have yet to be formally submitted, approved and implemented. The causes of this will be looked at in more detail later on in this Section.

The projects that have been implemented do show that site and service schemes can provide very low cost housing. The costs (in 1977 prices) vary from £44 to £115 per unit for the serviced site alone, to £312 to £439 for the plot plus the cost of building materials.

Two schemes were exceptionally costly however, and have already been the subject of criticism by ODM. In Swaziland, the Zahkele scheme was developed at a cost (in 1977 prices) of £600 per plot without building materials, because each plot had a high specification of services and was intended for sale to middle income families to build their own houses. The £836 unit cost (in 1977 prices) of the Betio Village Extension in the Gilbert Islands is not so easy to explain from the project documents as the standards aimed at were not particularly high.

In Botswana and Malawi, where most of the plots have been developed, costs have varied significantly. Some economies of scale are inferred in Malawi where the largest projects have a lower unit cost than similar, but smaller projects in Botswana. Nevertheless, extreme care must be taken in interpreting these figures and in making comparisons between dissimilar countries. Sudden cost variations may have arisen out of arbitrary alterations in exchange rates and estimates submitted for project approval are always subject to subsequent revision. Furthermore, the diverse conditions found in different countries, the availability of building materials, the nature of the soil, the topography and the structure of the building industry itself effectively preclude cost equalization as a meaningful objective for site and service schemes in different places.

In most cases, costs, have been kept down because schemes have all been implemented by direct labour, usually of the public works department. Only in one case, the installation of glass fibre and concrete aqua-privies in the Monarch Traditional Housing Area in Botswana, was a contractor used. However, as building firms become more experienced with site and service schemes, one can expect a greater participation of contractors.

Although the information on plot size is not complete, the largest are in Botswana, but even the smaller ones of Malawi are large enough for the safe environmental use of pit latrine sewerage. A smaller site, as in the case of the Zahkele scheme in Swaziland, makes waterborne sewerage essential, a factor that significantly increases the cost.

The schemes in Botswana and Malawi, with their modest levels of services, are those most directly aimed at lower income groups, and from reports in the field, appear to have been largely successful. Some of the difficulties encountered, surface drainage problems for example, would perhaps call for some technical assistance in addition to the on-site works personnel usually provided. In both countries, loans have been made available for the purchase of building materials, and specifications ensuring a minimum building standard have been laid down. In Malawi, either traditional or 'permanent' materials may be used in constructing the house. The same is true of Botswana although a distinction is made there between traditional housing areas (eg Monarch, Francistown) where round houses of traditional materials 'at least up to the rural standard' may be built, and site and service schemes proper, where 'permanent' materials must be used. In fact, the distinction is not so much between different types of housing as two classes of site and service scheme.

Nevertheless, the standards for this low-income self-built housing have been formally laid down in these two countries and probably many more. In spite of that, the difficulty of getting more site and service schemes implemented has been due, it has ofen been suggested, to a lack of political commitment among Governments and their unwillingness to lower their housing standards. At least in Botswana and Malawi, there has been no inhibition in adopting explicit codes that offer a specific place for such schemes. One would expect that other Governments wishing to supply cheap housing units to their poorer populations would be willing to do the same.

If it is assumed that site and service schemes are more generally accepted to Governments than has previously been thought, what other reasons are there for so few projects, given the priority they enjoy within the housing sector?

It would appear that other opportunities to support site and service schemes may have, in fact, been missed even though none was at the stage of a formal project submission. The very fact implies that a very positive, even promotional stance would have been required of ODM if a project were to materialize. In Belize for example, an informal request to finance 720 site and service plots in Belize City did not lead to a project. But why was this so? Exception was taken to the lack of a proper project submission with the request, but it is not clear from the file if this was the sole reason why a project did not materialize in this case.

In another case in Tanzania, consideration was being given to supporting site and service schemes in the 'ujamaa' villages, but a project has yet to materialize partly because it has been argued that the villages are too small to support such schemes. In this context, it should be pointed out that there is no absolute minimum economic size of site and service scheme even though the experience in Malawi has shown that there might be some economies of scale in a large project. From the technical viewpoint however, 25 plots might be considered a reasonable minimum, being the largest number of plots in Botswana that have been serviced by a single water standpipe. In the Tanzania case, however, other factors not evident in the files may have weighed against this type of site and service project.

In specific cases, possible opportunities for site and service projects have arisen which for various reasons have not materialized. In Guyana, with its tradition of self-help community projects, and Bolivia were identified candidates for such projects. Site and service schemes

had already figured in the housing policies of the Philippines and Sri Lanka, and some interest was expressed in requesting support from ODM. Nevertheless, ODM financed schemes have yet to be implemented in those countries.

These examples are not raised here in order to apportion blame for not having financed more schemes, but rather to show that a very positive stance by ODM is necessary to see a project through, even in countries where a political will exists to formulate them. However, it is important to study such cases in detail to identify the real potential for such projects.

At the time of the development of ODM's own policy interest in site and service schemes, the following countries which had not had schemes financed by ODM were considered to be likely candidates: Sudan, Ethiopia, Zambia, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Bolivia and Peru.[7] However, projects have still to be developed for these countries.

Perhaps in dealing with a housing concept which if not new in itself, has acquired a new significance in UK bilaterial aid, one must expect only its gradual application to project aid. So far a limited but interesting experience has been accumulated. At the same time, it must be recognized that other agencies, notably the World Bank and the EDF are also engaged in supporting site and service schemes, the latter on a much larger scale. Perhaps for this reason potential recipients would first turn to an agency which they associate more readily with such schemes.

Indeed, it seems that in practice, ODM has not given itself an important role to play in assisting site and service schemes and is perhaps willing to allow other agencies to predominate. This, in fact may explain the seeming lack of enthusiasm both in the posts and in the geographical desks for promoting such schemes. It is, therefore, important that ODM should encourage a greater awareness both throughout its own administration and among the posts abroad and recipient Governments, of the policy of supporting site and service schemes. An important component of this would be to make basic technical information of the nature of a site and service scheme more widely available to those who have a deal with project requests. It would also be important to make quite clear a genuine willingness to help prepare projects to be financed by specific commitments to site and service schemes.

But perhaps an important first step would be to examine more closely those few projects that have been implemented. They constitute a limited but extremely interesting experience which might be able to offer insights into how such projects might be tackled elsewhere, and most important, for ODM itself to understand why site and service projects were implemented in Malawi and Botswana and practically nowhere else. What were the essential features of bilateral aid relationship between those two countries and the UK within which ODM financed a number of schemes? Also, does this kind of relationship exist elsewhere?

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[7] In a more recent discussion of this matter, the list has been expanded to include: Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal, Philippines, Solomon Islands, Fiji, Gilbert Islands, Columbia and the West Indian Islands of the Caribbean. Ref. Meeting on Low Cost Housing of 31.3.76.

Finally, in concluding this section, it is important to remember the most important aspect of site and service schemes, namely, to what extent do they provide conditions for satisfying the aspirations of those whom they were intended to benefit? An answer to such a question would, however, only be speculative at this stage and must await the outcome of the necessary detailed, on-site project evaluations.

Housing for Low Income Groups

Housing projects intended for lower income groups in developing countries have had a longer history in UK bilateral aid than site and service schemes. Variously described as low cost, low income, village or labour housing, such projects came in for criticism within ODM itself for not being appropriate for lower income groups in those societies. The costs of such housing were not being kept down thereby placing it economically beyond the reach of those for whom it was apparently intended. In fact, the calls made for 'genuinely low-cost housing' were a direct criticism of inappropriate standards and they also opened the way for the wider application of the site and service approach.

Thus, in low income housing, one is dealing with a somewhat discredited aid concept which does not figure among the current priorities for ODM project aid. The most recent projects to have been approved for this type of housing were authorized some three years ago, and no new projects have been approved since then. This section, therefore, consists of an essentially historical review of the projects of the study period.

While all housing projects had, or should have had, in common the need to keep costs down in order to make it economic for low income groups to be able to demand the houses, it is clear that there has been varied success in this aim. The variation of cost per unit (in 1977 prices) is considerable. The cheapest, the Naledi Resettlement Scheme in Botswana, had only one-eighth the unit cost (in 1977 prices) of the most expensive High Density Labour Housing in the Gilbert Islands. The Naledi Scheme, although strongly criticized, is particularly interesting for its having been able to provide *genuinely* low cost housing for rent using a Costain system built approach and, as such, deserves to be evaluated in detail. The expenses of the Gilbert Island High Density Housing is derived from its higher standard finish and being constructed in blocks of flats. At the same time, however, it is far from being the highest cost housing project financed by ODM when projects with up to £15,000 per unit cost (in current prices) have been financed in Gibraltar, St Helena, the New Hebrides, as well as other projects in the Gilberts themselves. These projects were, however, not intended for low income families in the first place.

Although there have been twice as many low income housing projects as site and service schemes, only some 2,728 such houses have, in fact, been built, less than a quarter of the number of plots that have been provided through the much larger site and service schemes. Moreover, the total of funds committed to such housing has been over twice the commitment to site and service schemes. The latter, with their much lower unit cost, are clearly able to spread aid monies more widely. In the Seychelles, for example, which has had a reportedly good experience in providing housing for low income groups, the unit cost (in 1977 prices) is approximately four times as great as a typical site and service scheme including building materials.

Constant pressure has been exerted by ODM to get recipient countries to keep costs (and thence standards) of low income projects down but with varying success. In this respect. the most interesting experiences are in Botswana and the Seychelles. It must again be emphasized that a thorough, on-site evaluation would be necessary in order to draw specific conclusions about particular projects, and that such a study would permit a full appreciation of those experiences.

It is important to undertake such an evaluation in order to identify the role of housing units for low income groups that are made available for rent. These could perhaps meet the demand of those unable or unwilling to make the housing investment and commitment necessary to build upon a site and service scheme. In this respect, the Naledi Scheme in Botswana is particularly interesting although nearly all the housing projects listed here were intended for renting, often at a very subsidized rate.

While project costs can be kept down by making the house as simple as possible, it has not been feasible, in the experience of ODM funded projects, to provide houses as cheaply as they are built by the occupiers of site and service schemes. For this reason, there can be no doubt that the latter are able to reach lower income groups than a housing project as such can, subject, of course, to those groups' willingness to accept the home ownership commitment implied in a site and service scheme. Therefore, there may be a special role for low income housing for renting, in order to meet a potential demand that a site and service scheme cannot satisfy. This implies a study of the economic behaviour of low income groups to identify which groups would want to own a home and which groups would prefer to rent.

Before leaving the discussion of low income housing, it is important to recall that the cheapest option was a system built scheme of terraced housing at Naledi in Botswana. Research into a systems approach to low cost housing is being undertaken at the Building Research Establishment in the form of BREKIT. This is a method of producing standardized hollow concrete panels which are filled with soil when assembled on site. At the time of writing, the research is in an early stage so that its potential role as a method of supplying low cost housing for renting has yet to be realized. It was developed from the earlier, well-tried BRECAST system for building four-storey blocks of flats.[8]

To sum up, housing for low income groups has acquired, and is likely to continue to have, secondary importance to site and service schemes. Nevertheless, a useful and interesting experience in housing projects for low income groups has been built up through ODM finance especially in the Seychelles and Botswana. Although complete schemes cannot reach the same low level of income that a site and service scheme can because they cost perhaps four times as much, the two should not only be seen as competing alternatives. Instead, consideration should be given to the complementarity of low income housing schemes which provide houses for rent to those who are unwilling or unable to make the major financial commitment necessary to the home ownership implied in a site and service scheme.

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[8] Although building flats seems, from the experience of ODM funded projects, to be the most expensive solution for providing low income housing, the BRECAST way of building them may be among the cheapest.

Conclusions and Recommendations

This report has tried to summarize how ODM finance of housing projects has developed over the last decade. Even though it may not constitute a top priority sector itself, housing accounts for an important part of the total UK aid committed and spent on capital projects. There has been, nevertheless, a fall in the total aid committed to housing since 1968 largely because of declining support for high income housing projects which have constituted the majority during the period in question. Although a specific housing programme has not evolved, this trend, it has been argued in this report, is due to policy developments towards the sector in favour of site and service schemes. The latter now constitute the priority housing component of the aid strategy outlined in the 'More Help for the Poorest' White Paper.

In practice, this new priority has been reflected more in the decline in the number of other housing projects rather than an increase in site and service projects themselves. There have only been eight site and service projects financed by ODM and other opportunities for supporting further projects may have been missed.

It has been pointed out within ODM that recipient Governments are reluctant to propose site and service schemes because of the low housing standards that they are thought to imply. Nevertheless, it has been argued in this report that, even where a political will exists in the country concerned, ODM has still to adopt a very positive stance towards the project submission to ensure a successful outcome. Nevertheless, in dealing with a housing concept that has a relatively new priority in project aid, one must expect some time to elapse before it is widely implemented.

The few projects financed have, however, been very interesting. While they seem, from reports, to have been on the whole successful, a more detailed on-site evaluation is important to be able to judge their performance and to learn what is relevant in that experience for elsewhere. It is important to be kept informed about the progress of such schemes as they are *de facto* ongoing building projects which may last many years. As such, there is perhaps a special case for encouraging some technical assistance during that period.

There can be no doubt that a site and service scheme can reach a lower income group than a complete housing project can. ODM financed housing for low income groups has generally cost at least four times as much per unit than a serviced plot and allowance for building materials in a site and service scheme. Nevertheless, low cost housing may be complementary and meet a different need, in that it can provide simple houses for rent to those who are unwilling or unable to make the necessary investment required to fulfil the home-ownership commitment implicit in a site and service scheme. It is, therefore, important to pay particular attention to the appropriateness of a home ownership approach to housing especially in a situation where low income families prefer to make other investments in livestock and consumer durables for example, rather than housing.

Finally, in order to help encourage housing aid to move positively towards more support for site and service projects, the direction which ODM itself has charted, the following recommendations are made:

Recommendation One

ODM should continue to make further efforts to promote site and service schemes particularly in countries which have already embarked upon projects or have shown some interest in the idea. Specialist advisers should continue to be involved at the outset as well as assisting in the drafting of the project request where necessary.

Recommendation Two

A study whould be made of the success in implementing site and service schemes in particular countries and some assessment made of the potential for such projects elsewhere.

Recommendation Three

In order to ensure that all those dealing with requests to finance site and service schemes are fully informed about the concept, a short, simple, explanatory manual should be prepared. It would explain the different standards that can be adopted for a scheme, its role in UK aid policy, and how to go about preparing and dealing with a project submission. It should be specifically geared to the needs of ODM aid and should not attempt to duplicate the larger, more comprehensive documents already published by the World Bank and the United Nations. As well as being made available to Geographical Departments of ODM, the Development Divisions and the Posts, it should also be presented to interested Governments.

Recommendation Four

Encouragement should be given to the participation of volunteers in site and service schemes where they could live on site, build their own houses and offer technical assistance to other builders on simple matters such as interpreting building regulations, arranging for the purchase of materials, and basic design problems such as allowing for surface drainage etc. In order to do this, the volunteers would attend a short course of some four weeks at ODM or some supported institution where the working of a site and service scheme would be explained. The simple technology involved would be easily accessible to highly motivated young people and enable them to literally participate in the process of building a new community.

Recommendation Five

This recommendation concerns a more theoretical problem raised in the present report. It is that EPS undertake a study into the home ownership capacity and aspirations of low income families in countries where site and service schemes have been or could be developed. Such schemes can only succeed where there is commitment to home ownership on the part of the occupiers. It is therefore important to know under what circumstances and among which social and income groups this commitment is likely to be found. The study should also consider the possible role, if any, of low income housing for rent as a complementary provision to a site and service scheme.

Recommendation Six

Finally, a series of field studies should be prepared of the interesting experience of site and service schemes financed by ODM. In addition to examining the degree of implementation and the actual costs incurred, special attention should be paid in the studies to the income levels of the occupiers and their economic attitude towards savings and home ownership.

Africanization and the Merit Principle in the Zambian Public Service

GATIAN F LUNGU*

Introduction

The enthusiasm and obviousness with which the slogans of Africanization and the merit principle are sounded tend to obscure the complexities underlying them. Much havoc has been done to African public service systems in the name of Africanization; on the other hand, legitimate changes have been resisted for the sake of upholding the merit principle. A review of these terms, therfore, is necessary in order to appreciate their operationalization in the Zambian context.

Africanization

Africanization is a fluid term used in various contexts to refer to programmes aimed at realizing the ideals and aspirations of postindependence governments. When referring to the public service, the term has two meanings. First, it implies the process of replacing expatriate civil servants by nationals. This interpretation was emphasized in the early years of independence when European colonial officials occupied most upper-level civil service posts. However, it soon became apparent that mere replacement of white with black faces would not necessarily transform the public service into an African one. A second and more encompassing definition evolved. According to this second version, Africanization was construed as a process of transforming a colonial type civil service into a national one. In addition to changes in citizenship and perhaps the race of personnel, the process was also envisaged to include training and development of this personnel, structural changes of the public service and a change in the spirit of service in accordance with the policies of new governments.

Africanization was justified on several grounds. Adu[1] identifies political, economic, socio-cultural and security reasons as being part of the rationale for justifying the process. Politically, the attainment of independence would have to be matched with an African administration for reasons of nationalistic honour, pride and legitimacy. The struggle

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[1] Adu, A. L. (1969). *The Civil Service in Commonwealth Africa*. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.

against colonial rule was in a sense an expression of the desire of the people to manage their own affairs. It was also in part an expression of the desire to build a more responsible or answerable public service to the wider national constituency, in contrast to the narrow concerns of the colonial civil service.

Equally important was the economic aspect of Africanization. Expatriate manpower – consisting of old European colonial officials and the recently hired foreign personnel – is often highly skilled and commands high salaries. Even when they possess similar educational qualifications with nationals, expatriate personnel receive invariably higher salaries, and the gap between the two groups is widened further by several inducements including transport costs, children's allowances, ample loan facilities, highly subsidized housing and contract remunerations available to the latter group. In addition, expatriate salaries are a considerable drain on African foreign exchange reserves, a crucial yet a diminishing asset in many countries. The presence of expatriate personnel also acts as a cost-push factor in that Africans with comparable qualifications demand for equal salaries and fringe benefits. Economic concerns extend beyond those of personnel costs to include the promotion of national development. In the colonial era, civil service was primarily concerned with the maintenance of law and order, the collection of taxes, the provision of modest social services and small-scale public projects. After independence, African governments embarked upon ambitious projects of economic development and expanded social service programmes including free and universal education, socialized medicine and welfare institutions. New structures and orientations were needed to make the public service a developmental one.

Closely related to political and economic concerns were socio-cultural ones. The colonial civil servant stood aloof from the society he/she served. He/she came from an alien culture and often with racial prejudices. At independence, there was a natural desire to make the civil servant more aware of the socio-cultural setting. African officials could be expected to be in tune with local psychology and attitudes, especially in rural areas.

Finally, there was the issue of national security. Some sensitive departments including the police, the army, foreign affairs and intelligence units needed loyal and nationalistic personnel. It became increasingly difficult to confide official business to foreign officials whose parent countries might have rival interests. In these departments and units Africanization became a matter of national security.

The Merit Principle

Simultaneous with Africanization was the design of new merit systems in the public service of many countries. The colonial civil service was by and large a guardian-type institution in which the merit principle applied only to the selection of European officials in the metropolis to serve in overseas territories. Appointments, promotions and transfers in the senior grades were effected in mother countries, and in the case of Zambia and other ex-British territories, by the Colonial Office in London. Middle and lower grades of the civil service were staffed locally within the colonies but preferential appointments of European personnel was the main characteristic of the civil service. In Zambia and other east central African states Africans, even when well qualified, were totally excluded

from senior grades until the very last years of colonial rule. In the lower grades, African appointments were confined to clerical and executive posts. At independence, however, efforts were made to extend the merit principle to include Africans at all grade levels in the public service.

The concept of merit changes according to circumstances but generally it implies

> a system in which comparable achievement governs each individual's selection and progress in the service and in which conditions and rewards of performance contribute to the competency and continuity of the services.[2]

In the early years of independence, the merit principle, like Africanization, was interpreted in narrow and relatively static terms. It simply meant competitive selection of personnel based on civil service examinations, formal educational qualifications and interviews. In many countries the main objective of the merit system was to combat corruption, nepotism and tribalism in public service appointments. In the later years of independence, the merit principle was increasingly being interpreted in a more dynamic and developmental sense. The definition provided by the American Inter-governmental Personnel Act of 1970 was representative of emerging interpretations of the late 1960s and early 1970s:

i Recruiting, selecting and advancing employees on the basis of their relative ability, knowledge and skills, including open consideration of qualified applicants for initial appointment;

ii Providing equitable and adequate compensation;

iii training employees as needed, to assure high quality performance;

iv Retraining employees on the basis of the adequacy of their performance, and separating employees whose inadequate performance cannot be corrected;

v Assuring fair treatment of applicants and employees . . . without regard to political affiliation race, colour, national origin, sex, religious creed and with proper regard to their privacy and constitutional rights as citizens, and

vi Assuring that employees are protected against coercion for partisan political purposes and are prohibited from using their official authority for the purpose of interfering with or affecting the result of an election or nomination for office.[3]

The merit principle has been advocated for the purposes of securing competent personnel, especially now that jobs require sophisticated skills, for developing competencies lacking in the already hired personnel and, more importantly, for upholding the principle of equal opportunity for applicants to the public service.

The implementation of the merit system is influenced by several but interacting factors including the size of the public service and sectors to be included/excluded from merit procedures; personnel and financial resources to support both initial recruitment and further training; the degree of politicization of the public service; the strength/weakness of the mechanisms for enforcing merit procedures; and the degree of institutionalization of

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[2] Stahl, O. G. (1971). *Public Personnel Administration*. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers Inc., p 13.

[3] Nigro, F. A. and Nigro, L. G. (1976). *The New Public Personnel Administration*. Itasca, Illinois: F. E. Peacock Publishers, Inc., p 27

the public service within the society it operates. The degree to which Africanization influences the merit system is dependent upon the manner in which it affects the size, resources, politicization, merit-control mechanisms and the institutionalization of the public service. This can be expressed thusly:

$$M = A(S,R,P,C,I, \ldots n)$$

where
- M = the Merit Principle,
- A = the Rate of Africanization,
- S = the Size of the Public Service,
- R = Personnel and Financial Resources,
- P = the Degree of Politicization of the Public Service,
- C = Control mechanisms of Merit Procedures,
- I = the degree of institutionalization of the public service in a given society, and
- n = other pertinent factors.

It is hypothesized that Africanization programmes which tend to rapidly increase the size of the public service, based on inadequate personnel and financial resources, operated in highly politicized contexts, with weak merit control mechanisms and a relatively under-institutionalized public service are likely to weaken the merit principle. The remainder of this paper is focused on examining this assumption in the Zambian public service.

The Merit Principle in the Colonial Civil Service

The present Zambian public service is a direct descendant of the colonial civil service of the then British protectorate of Northern Rhodesia. As elsewhere in British protectorates, the Northern Rhodesia Civil Service was controlled by the Colonial Office in London. It was constructed to execute imperial policies, and its orientation and personnel were, therefore, suited to this purpose.

The application of the merit principle was influenced by the stage of constitutional development. In the early years of colonial rule, roughly from 1889 to 1923, the territory of Northern Rhodesia was administered by the British South Africa Company (BSAC) and there was no civil service in the conventional sense of the term. Administrative staff were drawn mainly from BSAC's hierarchy, colonial regiments and occupational forces and supervised by the British High Commissioner in South Africa. In 1924 Northern Rhodesia became a British protectorate under direct control of the Crown through the Colonial Office in London. The establishment of a protectorate government marked the beginning of a formal civil service system headed by a territorial governor. Not unnaturally, British civil service traditions, including the merit system, were exported to the territory. An overriding ideal of the British civil service system was that of political neutrality of civil servants, and Simwinga observes thus of this ideal in colonial Zambia:

> A strict separation between politics and public administration based on the Whitehall model was maintained . . . It was found necessary to adopt the British model regardless of relevance to the local scene. The strict dichotomy was founded on the theory of a multiparty system of Government. It was argued that because of the possibility of periodic changes under a multiparty system of government such as this, there was need to maintain an orderly government and to foster continuity after the change of political fortunes among the competing political parties . . . It was further argued that a

civil service that was enmeshed in party politics would find it difficult to remain impartial and use professional judgement on issues involving fundamental political ideologies of the parties they openly associated with.[4]

Appointment to the Northern Rhodesian Civil Service was, therefore, to be based on merit criteria. The historian L. H. Gan has noted that senior servants appointed to serve in Northern Rhodesia after 1924 were without exception graduates of Oxford and Cambridge universities.[5] These were 'gentlemen' trained in the classical tradition and expected to exhibit civil and moral leadership to the subject peoples. Between 1924 and 1952 the territory's civil service was very small, and the positions of importance were those of the governor of the territory, his ministers, permanent secretaries, provincial and district commissioners. The senior civil service grades were entirely European in composition and the merit procedures were confined to this group.

In 1953 Northern Rhodesia joined Nyasaland (now Malawi) and Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe-Rhodesia) to form the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland or the British Central African Federation. Under the new government there were two categories of the civil service: the European Civil Service and the African Civil Service. The former comprised of senior and the latter junior grades. While entry to either service was based on meritocratic criteria, the separation between the two was not. Racial divisions prevented the full realization of the merit ideal in the Federal civil service. In addition, issues of training and re-training, representativeness and equality of opportunity to apply for civil service jobs were not part of the system's concerns.

In 1961 the future of the Central African Federation hung in balance as both Africans and Europeans of the three territories had agitated against its existence. Developments elsewhere in Africa pointed toward independence. Accordingly, the Federation civil service was reformed to prepare for eventual independence in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Racial divisions were abolished and a unified civil service was introduced with merit appointments applicable to applicants of both races. By 1964 when Northern Rhodesia became the new nation under the name Zambia the racial composition of the civil service had changed very little. The breakdown of the Civil Service was as follows:

Division Grade	*Europeans*	*Africans*	*Others*	*Total*
I	1,256	39	3	1,298
II	2,692	1,882	11	4,585
Total	3,948	1,921	14	5,883

Source: Zambia: The *Hadow Report*. Lusaka: Government Printer, 1964, p 14.

Thus, at independence, Zambia had inherited a civil service in which the merit system was haphazardly implemented, save for the last two years of colonial rule. The long absence of

[4] Simwinga, G. K. (1978). "The Changing Role of Public Administration in Zambia," *Zango*, Nos. 4/5, August, pp 13-14.

[5] Gann, L. H. (1964). *A History of Northern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1953*. London: Chatto and Windus.

training and development of African personnel and their exclusion from senior posts bequeathed to the new government problems almost unparalleled in post-independence Africa. In both East and West Africa the British had left relatively more Africanized civil service systems than in Zambia. At independence, for example, Ghana (1957) had 60% of her senior civil service posts Africanized, Nigeria (1960) 61%, Kenya (1963) 23% and Tanzania (1963) 18%. By contrast, Zambia had only 4% of her senior civil service posts Africanized in 1965, a year after her independence. The situation was compounded further by lack of training facilities in the country: Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya and Tanzania each had university institutions from where they secured high-level manpower. There was no university in Zambia prior to 1966, and the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, located in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, did not cater for African educational needs. In 1964 the new Zambian government had barely 100 university graduates to rely on, most of these were trained outside the Federation. This educational deprivation was in part responsible for constraining future Africanization and merit programmes.

Independence and Zambianization

The new Zambian government kept most of the conventions of the colonial civil service as it had developed in the last two years of colonial rule. In the period between 1964 and 1972, referred to as the First Republic, the Zambian public service, as it was now re-christened, was almost an exact replica of the British system. In principle, the public service was to remain:

> efficient, stable and impartial, and its morale high. Only thus can it serve as an effective machinery for executing the policies of government. It should therefore be able to recruit from the best talents available in the community and assure them the conditions that would induce them to stay in the service . . . the procedures for selection for entry into the civil service and for promotions within it must be not only impartial but must be seen manifestly to be impartial. This procedure must be based on the criteria of merit and public interest, and not on political influence and patronage.[6]

The new government instituted a number of devices to help uphold and implement the merit principle. General Orders prohibited civil servants to openly participate in politics, the rationale being, as was the case during the colonial days, the maintenance of neutrality and impartiality of the civil service. A public service commission was formed as an independent body, charged with the responsibility of effecting civil service appointments, promotions, transfers and dismissals. Competitive written examinations were introduced as the basis for promotion of personnel within the civil service establishment. Facilities for training public administrators were built, notable of which were the National Institute for Public Administration and the President Citizenship College. The University of Zambia Department of Political and Administrative Studies trained undergraduates in public administration.

Simultaneous with the consolidation of the merit system was the rapid expansion of the public service and an accelerated programme for Zambianizing senior grades. Between 1964 and 1972 the Zambian public service grew from 72 departments under 14 ministries to 102 departments and 16 ministries.[7] The personnel establishment grew from 22,561 in

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[6] Adu, A. L. op. cit., p 136.

[7] Zambia. (1972). Cabinet Office Circular no. 8. Lusaka: Government Printer.

1964 to 51,497 in 1969.[8] A great majority of Division I and II posts were held by Zambians in 1969 who totalled about 76% of the total public service establishment. The changing composition of the service is illustrated below:

CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	*PERCENTAGE OF ZAMBIANS*	
	1966	*1971*
Professional	17.6	17.7
Administrative and Executive	46.5	87.4
Technical	45.4	67.2
Teachers	82.9	83.7
All Categories	70.8	83.7

Source: Zambia: *Second National Development Plan: 1966-72*. Lusaka: Government Printer, 1966.

A great deal of Zambianization was achieved in the first two years of independence between 1964 and 1966. It was the fastest in the administrative sector and slowest in the professional sectors of medicine, engineering, architects and secondary school teachers (not reflected in the teachers category above).

The Zambianization programme was originally planned to proceed with training programmes. Between 1964 and 1969 the government spent an annual amount of K5,000,000* on domestic training effort. In 1969 the Zambianization and Training Committee for the Public Service (ZTCPS) was established to review the progress of Zambianization and training plans within each government ministry and department.[9] The findings of the ZTCPS revealed a very unsatisfactory state of affairs and confirmed the fears expressed earlier on by President Kaunda thus:

> I must indicate how disgusted I have been in the past by the apathy, sheer lack of initiative and indiscipline which has been prevalent in the Civil Service. I must say that this has not helped to accelerate development at the pace UNIP (United National Independence Party) and its Government wanted . . . in future I will certainly take the strongest measures possible to deal firmly with any manifestations of apathy and indiscipline in the public service . . . let alone any manifestations of corruption.[10]

It was apparent that Zambianization had not manifested the effect it was intended to, and more vexing, it began to erode the merit system. It is to this problem that we must now turn.

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[8] Tordoff, W. and Molteno, R. (1974). "Government and Administration," in W. Tordoff, ed., *Politics in Zambia*. Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, p 269.

*1 Zambian Kwacha (ZK) was equivalent to U.S.$1.40 in 1970.

[9] Simmance, A. F. F. (1973). "Zambianization and Manpower," in C. Gertzel, ed., *The Political Process in Zambia, Vol. II*. Lusaka: University of Zambia, p 179.

[10] Kaunda, K. D. (1968). Presidential Address to the United National Independence Party, Zambia.

Problems

Africanization, Size and Quality of Personnel

The rate of Zambianization, calculated at 7% per annum between 1964 and 1972, inevitably lowered standards of recruitment and performance in the public service. A survey of formal educational and professional qualifications of middle-level civil servants in 1969 revealed that only 6% had university degrees, 22% had completed the Cambridge Overseas School Certificate and 67% had less than secondary school qualifications.[11] A similar survey of senior-level personnel (i.e. permanent secretaries) in 1973 indicated that of the 47 interviewed only 16 held university degrees.[12] The situation was compounded further by inadequate training facilities and the exodus of expatriate personnel, estimated at an annual average of 25% between 1964 and 1969. The National Institute for Public Administration, the President Citizenship College and the University of Zambia could not meet the demands for high-level civil service manpower during this period. The programmes in these institutions, especially the National Institute for Public Administration and the President Citizenship College, left much to be desired. Training programmes were often of three months duration and focused on tangential matters such as records management, Zambian Humanism (the official ideology of the ruling party) and other routine aspects of public administration. Training at the University of Zambia was slow and often too academic and tied to the traditional discipline of political science. Moreover, it was not certain that public administration graduates would stay in the civil service, for mobility from the civil service to parastatal organizations and private companies was very high in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

The exodus of expatriate personnel was often disorderly and abrupt. Many were leaving before the end of their contracts, and the contracts were often of two or three year duration. This meant that there were more vacancies than would be filled in any given year. In 1965, for example, there were 9,652 public service jobs and only 60.8% of these were filled. By 1969 there were 15,198 jobs in the senior divisions (I and II) and only 74.6% were filled. To alleviate the shortage the government brought in many unqualified and under-qualified personnel to fill in the posts. Thus, by 1972 the Zambian public service was composed of relatively young, under-educated and inexperienced personnel. These elements do not necessarily lower standards of performance in public bureaucracies, but in the Zambian context they proved to be serious handicaps to technical competence, rational judgement and the neutral commitment of many civil servants.

The Politicization of Public Service

Despite official pronouncements in support of the merit system, the jockeying for power among dominant political parties and the desire to reward political supporters led to the infiltration of the public service by partisan appointments. As early as 1964, the post of Permanent Secretary, the highest civil service appointment, was excluded from the merit system. The president of the Republic made direct and often partisan appointments to many senior civil service posts. In 1969 a Constitutional Amendment Act was passed which

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[11] Tordoff, W. and Molteno, R., *op. cit.*, p 267.

[12] Momba, J. (1973). "Permanent Secretaries," in R. Molteno, ed., *Studies in Zambian Government and Administration*. Lusaka: University of Zambia, p 38

put the head of the public service, hitherto a civil servant, a political appointee of cabinet rank. The Act also empowered the president of the Republic to delcare political, any post in the public service at his discretion. Between 1969 and 1972 a considerable size of the public service, almost the entire senior sector, was placed outside the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission and excluded from merit procedures. In addition, all senior and middle level public servants were required to join the membership of the ruling party – the United National Independence Party. Later, pressure was exerted on lower levels of the public service to secure party membership. In March, 1969, for example, the minister of Information

> had openly told civil servants in his ministry that they could not effectively perform their jobs of communicating government policy to the people unless they were loyal to UNIP. He even asked all non-party members to seek ministerial transfers out of his ministry.[13]

The politicization trend reached its peak in 1973 when a one-party state was introduced. It was argued that the neutrality of the public service under a one-party government was not necessary, since the interests of the party and the civil service would be identical. It was further argued that a public service that identified itself with party ideals and policies would implement them effectively. Accordingly, the one-party constitution of 1973 allowed civil servants to freely participate in politics. This meant that they would be free to stand for national elections, join the party as members and send representatives to various policy-making bodies of the party.[14] However, civil servants would not hold any party post due to the demanding nature of their jobs.

The official interpretation of these changes was that they would not affect the merit system:

> this does not mean that civil service ethics should be thrown to the wind, no by any means. On the contrary, the civil servants in identifying themselves with the party by participating in politics through exercising their democratic rights, should take pains to ensure that they do nothing which will reflect adversely on the civil service as a whole.[15]

This statement notwithstanding, later events in the 'Second Republic', as the one-party state is often referred to, were to show that the merit principle was thrown to the winds. We noted earlier on that in the 'First Republic' membership in the ruling party was required for appointment to senior public service grades. Under the 'Second Republic' regime, non-members are regarded with suspicion and often identified with dissenters of former opposition parties. Power to appoint, promote, transfer and dismiss personnel shifted from the Public Service Commission to the president of the Republic, who is also president of the party. To a certain extent this shift of responsibility from the Public Service Commission to the president has aided the application of merit procedures. In many instances President Kaunda used his executive powers to appoint very able men and women to the public service. He has stated on several occasions that he will not hesitate to use his powers to counteract corruption, nepotism and tribalism in the public service. This promise has so far

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[13] Simwinga, G. K., *op. cit.*, p 15.

[14] Zambia. (1972). *Report on the National Commission on the establishment of a One-Party Participatory Democracy in Zambia*. Lusaka: Government Printer, pp 14-15.

[15] Milner, A. M. (1973). Speech of the Secretary-General to the Government to Civil Servants attending a course at the National Institute of Public Administration, on June 13, mimeo.

been kept. Zambians have become accustomed to what is known as 'Kaunda's Axe' in government ministries and public corporations. Many public officials have been fired or suspended for violating public service ethics. Reshuffles, estimated at 2½ per annum, have been commonplace in both the cabinet and senior public service grades. Indeed, the President has shown remarkable administrative shrewdness by rotating important cabinet and public service posts among individuals from various ethnic groups. He has also shown his concern for representativeness by appointing a number of women to cabinet and senior public service posts.

Yet positive as it has been presidential power is not a substitute for the merit system precisely because it depends on personal attributes of the incumbent. Moreover, the public service has grown too big for one man, and most of the measures taken against violators of public service ethics affect senior officials, leaving middle and lower level employees untouched. The impact of Kaunda's Axe on the public service morale has not yet taken a definitive direction. Drastic measures such as dismissals, suspensions and demotions may have an immediate impact by triggering panic and fear in the culprits and by checking administrative problems temporarily. In the long run, however, they can be ineffective. This is in part due to the fact that such measures involve threats which are so drastic that they are unwieldy and cannot be used to correct marginal situations. Administrators quickly learn to resort to more covert methods of exercising their influence, and try to beat the system by subterfuges and blackmailing it. The Axe, therefore, may be having a negative demonstration effect. This may help explain the persistence of corruption and other malpractices in the public service, despite the President's 15-year old battle against them.

Weak Enforcing Mechanisms

The responsibility for enforcing merit procedures was lodged in several bodies: the Public Service Commission, the Personnel Division in the Office of the President, the ombudsman (known as the Investigator General) and Parliament. The Public Service Commission shared its duties with the Personnel Division in appointing, promoting and removing civil servants. Initial recruitment, however, was done by the Personnel Division. The ombudsman was instituted much later than the Public Service Commission or the Personnel Division. It was created in 1973 to investigate complaints and cases brought before it from the public servic and the party. It was, therefore, not only concerned with civil service ethics but a wide range of issues related to the public service, public corporations and the party. Parliament monitors activities of the public service through ministerial accountability to it, as well as through special committees. All these mechanisms have proved ineffective in enforcing the merit principle. The Public Service Commission as well as the Personnel Division have found themselves dealing with less and less matters relating to senior servants who have increasingly fallen under direct presidential responsibility. Since most problems concerning the application of merit procedures are found within the senior grades, the exclusion of these grades from the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission has confined the latter to dealing with minor problems of junior public service grades. The ombudsman has been in operation for a relatively short period – for less than five years. During this period it has been confronted by many problems including staff shortage, transport facilities and lack of positive response

from the public service in general. Of the 263 complaints brought before it in 1975, only 76 were taken up, and these dealt mainly with minor problems of appointments and dismissals of junior officials. Complaints from the public about the civil service were ignored, so were issues of corruption and nepotism. The ombudsman has become an institution which removes minor irritations within the administrative system without affecting the core of the problem: the violation of public service ethics. Finally, the role of Parliament in enforcing merit procedures leaves much to be desired. Cabinet ministers, who are also members of Parliament, are not subjected to thorough scrutiny by their fellow parliamentarians, especially on matters affecting their ministries and departments. Part of the problem has been that ministers themselves go to Parliament unprepared for questions related to their administrative responsibilities. Other members of Parliament also possess very little information about ministries. In the absence of adequate knowledge about administrative problems parliamentarians find it difficult to monitor merit procedures. However, the main limitation faced by parliamentarians has been censorship of criticisms against government policy. In the early months of the one-party state parliamentarians had become very outspoken in their criticisms against government departments and general policies. This provoked a self-defensive reaction from senior party members and ministers who issued warnings to the critics and threatened them with punitive measures should they persist in their virulent criticisms. Thus, with Parliament weakened from both within and without, the merit system has had no strong defender or enforcer, and the resulting vacuum has increasingly been filled by the president of the Republic.

An Under-Institutionalized Public Service

A relatively high degree of institutionalization of the public service is required if it is to perform adequately. Institutionalization of government bureaucracies has different meanings to various people. It is construed here as the process in which a given public service comes to terms with the society it serves. The public service strives to adapt itself to the values of the society in which it operates. On the other hand, society comes to accept it, not only for what it does for its people, but also for its intrinsic value. Peoplee build their lives around it and identify with it. They promote its cause, protect and support it from internal and external dangers and monitor its effectiveness in executing government policies. The Zambian public service is far from this position. During the colonial era, many Zambians had little to do with it, and after independence many continue to be isolated from it. Many still, including those employed by it, are illiterate; they do not understand its operations let alone its purposes. Most administrative problems go unnoticed by ordinary citizens, except when they themselves come into direct contact with officials. Even when problems are spotted, many Zambians are relatively unaware of their responsibility and rights *vis-à-vis* the bureaucracy. A villager who has been maltreated by government officials rarely knows where to resort to for a remedy to his or her problem. Usually, frustration with the public service results into resignation and, ultimately, apathy of the common man. To this must be added linguistic problems. English was adopted as the official and national language. Few Zambians can speak or read English well, and surprisingly enough even among the public officials themselves. For the most part, the public service has been an elitist institution, free from pressures of an attentive public (such as those found in Western countries). Under such circumstances, it becomes difficult to obtain public support for the merit system, for the public itself does not understand what the system is and how to defend it.

Conclusion

This paper has briefly examined the relationship between Africanization and the merit principle in the Zambian public service. It has been argued that the relationship between the two has not always been positive. It would appear that Zambia has had neither the resources nor the spirit to harmonizee Africanization programmes with the merit principle. Inevitably, Africanization has been accompanied by the weakening of the merit system. This has been compounded further by the politicization of the public service in the later years of the First Republic and the beginning of the Second Republic.

However, there are other issues of great importance which this paper has stirred but not explored. For example, it has not examined the impact of politicization on the effectiveness of the public service. It has often been argued by advocates of the merit principle that meritocratic procedures lead to an effective public service. There is some evidence outside Africa to suggest that this may not be the case. The Indian Civil Service has kept many traditions of the British merit system, but has been ineffective in dealing with problems of national development. By contrast, the Chinese Civil Service, if it can be so called, has been a highly politicized one, but its performance has invariably been recognized as one of the most effective in the developing world. This superficial comparison suggests that both meritocratic and politicized public service systems may help improve administrative effectiveness in third world countries, but for each to do so requires certain political conditions to guarantee its implementation. The merit system we have discussed in this paper has been developed in western industrial democracies, and the politicized civil service that Zambia has attempted to introduce is an importation from the Eastern socialist states. Part of the problem with either system in Zambia is that the country is neither an advanced industrial democracy of the western brand nor a socialist state, but a developing country with an undefined political system. This transitional state of affairs is largely responsible for haphazard implementation of either system.

Institution Building in Thailand

THOMAS E MORGAN*

PART I: THE NORTHERN AGRICULTURAL CENTRE IN CHIANG MAI

The institution building model of social change has received considerable attention in the literature on development and in the programmes of international assistance agencies.[1] Two well known examples of the application of this model in Thailand are the National Institute of Development Administration and the District Officer Academy. Attempts to create development institutions in Thailand may also be found in the fields of public health, rural development and agriculture. Those efforts at institution building in Thailand which have been implementeed within the confines of the authority of a single administrative agency have tended to have less difficulty establishing themselves than those which have involved more than one agency.[2] Nevertheless, many areas of endeavour, especially those of agriculture and public health, require the participation of several administrative agencies in a common effort. The question confronting the Thai government, therefore, increasingly becomes one of how to establish a mechanism to bring disparate and probably competitive agencies together for co-ordinated work.

The following discussion concerns the attempts by the Ministry of Agriculture (since 1972 the Minstry of Agriculture and Cooperatives) to establish regional centres for the purpose of implementing a policy of integrated agricultural development. This policy began to receive serious attention by the Thai Government nearly twenty years ago when the first of a series of regional agricultural centres was established at Chainat on the Chao Phya River. Three other centres were subsequently set up in the North-east, the North and the South of

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[1] Among the more comprehensive academic treatments are: Joseeph W. Eaton (ed.), *Institution Building and Development: From Concepts to Application* (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications); Milton J. Esman, *Administration and Development in Malaysia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972); D. Woods Thomas, Harry R. Potter, William L. Miller, Adrian F. Aveni (eds.) *Institution Building: A Model of Applied Social Change* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1972).

[2] The National Institute of Development Administration has grown steadily since it was initially established as the Institute of Public Administration (IPA) at Thammasat University. Alexander Caldwell, however, feels that the IPA served more to promote traditional bureaucratic values than to modify them. On the other hand, he sees the District Officer Academy as a more successful example of an institution building effort. *American Economic Aid to Thailand* (Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1974), p 120-121.

Thailand. Particular attention will be given to the Northern Agricultural Development Centre (NADC) located in the province of Chiang Mai. However, since the NADC evolved from the experience gained from its two predecessors, it will be helpful to look briefly at these before considering the NADC itself. Both earlier centres were intended to facilitate co-ordination in the field among the departments of the Ministry of Agriculture. However, they suffered from the lack of an implementation plan which took into account the non-technical obstacles, particularly those of a political nature, to successfully achieving the objectives of the centres.[3] The NADC, in contrast had a strategy and attempted to follow it.

The Chainat Centre

The regional agricultural centre at Chainat was established in 1964 as a direct result of the Greater Chao Phya Development Project. This irrigation project, which was funded by an International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) loan, was to irrigate a substantial portion of the Central Plains as well as to control water depth on the lower reaches of the river. Among the conditions required by the IBRD for granting the loan was the establishment of an agricultural station to service the area of the project, and a further condition that the Thai Government seek technical assistance in preparing an agricultural development programme. Technical assistance was sought from the Australian Government, and a 1.38 million baht* grant was provided by the Colombo Plan. The Thai Government provided land and funds for the operation and maintenance of the centre.[4]

The Ministry of Agriculture required each of its functional departments to send units to work at the centre. However, the objective of developing a multi-disciplinary approach to agricultural problems was not achieved. Each unit maintained its own experimental plots, separate residences for its officials, and communicated principally with its own head offices in Bangkok. Information was not shared with other departments at the centre. The director of the centre, moreover, had no responsibility or authority to determine what research was to be carried out at the centre.[5]

The Northeast Agricultural Research Centre (NEARC)

The NEARC received more thorough consideration in its design phase than did the Chainat Centre. A team from the United States Department of Agriculture was brought to Thailand in 1963 to advise the Thai Government on agricultural development. The team proposed creating a regional research centre at Tha Phra near the city of Khonkaen. The centre, according to the team, should co-ordinate its programmes with other departmental programmes of the Ministry of Agriculture. Aware of the deficiencies of the Chainat Centre they stressed the need to provide the centre director with real authority. The plan which

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[3] Australia, Department of External Affairs, Thai-Australia Chao-Phya Research Project: First Report to the Ministry of Agriculture of the Kingdom of Thailand, Part A, November 1968, pp 2 and 3.

**approx 44 baht* = £1 (Ed).

[4] *Ibid.*, pp 4 and 27-29; Ministry of Agriculture, Chainat Agricultural Station, *Raingan pracham pi 2514* [Annual report 1971], p 1, Interviews with NADC officials.

[5] Caldwell, *Economic Aid*, p 115.

was proposed specified that the director report directly to the Under-Secretary of State and have full control over the functions, funds, personnel and property of the centre.[6]

A report by the Bureau of the Budget and the Public Administration Services of Chicago (a private consulting firm) reaffirmed the ideas set forth by the 1963 advisory team and worked out these ideas in considerable detail, adding a proposal to reorganize the Ministry of Agriculture. The objective of the proposed reorganization was to establish the Office of the Under-Secretary as the focal point of the whole Ministry and to provide the office the means to give effective direction to departmental activities. The Office of the Under-Secretary approximated a department in rank, but in terms of its staff and influence it was merely a small secretariat responsible for routine housekeeping chores within the ministry.

The regional agricultural offices to be set up under the plan were to have four component sub-divisions: (1) an operations unit, (2) a technical services unit, (3) a regional agricultural research centre, and (4) a regional agricultural promotion centre.[7] Though these features were not employed at the NEARC, they were to reappear in the plans for the NADC.

Although departments assigned personnel to the centre, these remained under departmental discipline and co-ordination of programmes was not achieved. In an effort to provide the NEARC with a highly qualified staff an extensive scholarship programme was undertaken with the support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). However, most of those who returned from abroad with graduate degrees in agriculture were siphoned off by their parent departments.[8] Consequently work at the centre stagnated.

Although the NEARC can be considered a failure in that its objectives were not achieved, its failure was instructive to the adherents of integrateed development in that it demonstrated the need to have an implementation strategy for susequent attempts to institutionalize this concept in the Ministry of Agriculture.

The Northern Agricultural Development Centre (NADC)

The Northern Agricultural Development Centre was similar in concept to the NEARC. It differed, however, with regard to a number of structural and staffing characteristics. The most significant difference for the behaviour of the NADAC was that its supporters had a clearly conceived implementation strategy that took into account possible contingencies and prepared responses.

The development of a regional agricultural centre in the North actually began in 1970. At that time the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) office in Bangkok sent personnel to

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[6] *Ibid.*, pp 117-119.

[7] Ministry of Agriculture, *Kham chi chaeng kan kho prapprung suan rachakan lae chat atra chaonathi samnakngan palat krasuang krasuang kaset* [Explanation of the request to upgrade the administration and to establish the personnel ratio of the office of the under-secretary of state, ministry of agriculture], 1964, p 1.

[8] *Ibid., p 117.*

northern Thailand to report on sites which would be appropriate for such a centre. Later that year Chiang Mai was chosen as the location of the centre, although previously some attention had been given to the province of Lampang.[9]

The initial plans of the Thai Government and the FAO called for the NADC to be yielding results by 1974, and for the centre to be in full operation by 1982. A number of important proposals were made concerning the nature of the centre which differentiated it sharply from its predecessors. Among these proposals were that the NADAC serve as the co-ordinating agency for experimental stations, regional and provincial extension offices of the Ministries of Agriculture, National Development (abolished in 1972), Finance and Interior, as well as the Applied Science Research Corporation of Thailand and Chiang Mai University in-so-far as agricultural development was concerned. It was also proposed that the NADAC train research workers and extension officers, as well as administrative officers and local leaders, on subjects related to agriculture in the North.[10]

These were far reaching proposals and, if implemented, would inevitably have major repercussions on the relations between the Ministry of Agriculture and other government agencies in the North. Were other regional agricultural centres to be modified to correspond with the NADC pattern, these influences would be felt throughout the country.[11] Although the proposals were not fully implemented, an attempt was made to move in the direction which they suggested. A strategy incorporating improved technical capacity, acculturation to developmental norms and encouragement of behaviour in accordance with these norms, was coupled with an active pursuit of linkages to potential clients and supporters. An effort was also made to lessen the opposition from agencies which viewed the NADC as a threat to their interests.[12]

The designated director of the NADC had participated in an evaluation of the NEARC in early 1970 and noted the reticence of departments in the Ministry of Agriculture to make commitments to that centre. Moreover, this official was a Special Grade officer (the highest Civil Service category) whose career had largely been spent with the Office of the Under-Secretary. Another member (a foreign consultant) of the 1970 evaluating team, and one who was influential in setting up the organization of the NADC, had extensive knowledge of the Chainat Centre because of many years work with the Royal Irrigation Department. The NADC also benefited from the influence of a young and dynamic deputy under-secretary who firmly supported the regional centre concept. During the 1960s this deputy under-secretary served on the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) which

[9] Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome, 'Report to the Government of Thailand on the Northern Region Agricultural Centre', 1971, p 26 (Mimeographed).

[10] *Ibid., p 36.*

[11] During the summer of 1976 the Council of Ministers issued a resolution that the regional agricultural centres be reorganized along the pattern of the NADC. However, by the beginning of 1979 the NEARC in Khonkaen operated in the same fashion as it had done previously.

[12] Interviews with NADC and UNDP officials.

was gradually becoming supportive of a policy to disaggregate the planning process on a regional basis.[13]

The primary proponents of regionalizing the activities of the Ministry of Agriculture were individuals who had roots outside of the line departments of the ministry. They were prepared to perceive development on a much broader basis than could those with loyalties only to their own departments.

The greatest obstacle which faced the NADC was that regionalization was perceived as a threat by the line departments. If pursued to its logical conclusion, regionalization would mean the gradual whittling away of their line activities until they became technical units servicing the regional agencies of the ministry.[14]

Accordingly, proponents of thee NADC tried to present their organization in a way that emphasized how the NADC would strengthen existing departments. For example, it was stressed that the departments would benefit for their access to the laboratory facilities and the data acquired by the centre on regional conditions.[15]

Development of the NADC – 1972 to 1976

The NADC began operations in 1972 in two rooms provided by the Faculty of Agriculture at Chiang Mai University. This period was primarily one of establishing a presence in the North and of defining the nature of the Centre. During this time negotiations were conducted with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for assistance with the project. A Taiwanese irrigation expert working for the RID was recruited to prepare the request for UNDP support. This request was accepted in late 1972. The final draft of the project proposal was approved by the FAO in August 1973.[16]

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[13] USAID, University of Kentucky Team, 'Annual Report 1973 – Northeastern Agricultural Research Center', pp 148, 150-151; Caldwell, Economic Aid, p 119; Peter Kung, Krui Punyasing, Virach Arromdee, and Jamees H. Jensen, 'Review Team Report on Northeast Agricultural Development Center', 9 March 1970, cited in Caldwell, *Economic Aid*, p 118; E. C. Chapman, 'Studies of Contemporary Thailand: An Introduction', in Robert Ho and E. C. Chapman (eds.) *Studies of Contemporary Thailand* (Canberra: Research School of Pacific Studies, 1973), p 224; Interviews with NADC officials.

[14] Caldwell notes that a major obstacle to the NADC was that it threatened the vested interests of the line departments. *Economic Aid*, p 121.

[15] Caldwell notes that the failure of institution building efforts in Thailand has occurred when potential clients of such agencies were dubious of the benefits to be derived. *Economic Aid*, p 121; Orlin J. Scoville and James J. Dalton stress that mutual advantage is needed to effect co-ordination among disparate agencies. 'Rural Development in Thailand: the ARD Programme', *The Journal of Developing Areas* 9/1 (October 1974): 68; Interviews with NADC officials.

[16] United Nations Development Programme, 'Country and Inter-Country Programming and Projects', DP/16*, 15 October 1973, p 21; United Nations Development Programme, 'Establishment and Operation of a Northern Region Agricultural Development Centre, Chiang Mai, Thailand', n.d., p 1; Interviews with NADC officials.

The facilities at the Faculty of Agriculture became too small by early 1973. In an excellent example of co-operation between governmental agencies, the Rector of Chiang Mai University offered the NADC the use of the former Monk's Hospital free of charge except for operating costs. After several months, when more space was needed, the Rector provided another building for the NADC. The university also provided a large part of the office furniture used by the Centre.[17]

This early period was also one of a rapid acquisition of staff by the NADC. Initially, the Centre had only the status of a temporary agency and consequently had no civil service posts assigned to it. The staff consisted of hired personnel who would become regular civil servants when the NADC gained permanent status. In building its staff, the NADC differed significantly from its predecessors. The Centre director was given the authority to set requirements for personnel and to test applicants without interference by the Civil Service Commission. The staff included only a few seconded officials, in contrast to the previous centres where most officials were on temporary duty. In the case of the NADC the seconded officials were eventually to be transferred permanently to the Centre. Consequently, staff loyalty was directed to the Centre, rather than toward a parent department.

The Centre also adopted a policy of hiring only northerners, instead of recruiting from the entire country. This was done to promote a sense of identity between the staff of the Centre and the people of the region. This was an unusual procedure because normal civil service practice required competition to be open to all throughout the country. By relying on hired personnel during its initial period the NADC was able to circumvent this requirement.

In contrast to earlier centres, at the NADC there were no provisions whereby the staff would be sent abroad for study. This feature was pointed to with pride by the leaders of the Centre. The NEARC suffered particularly from the tendency of officials returning from graduate studies to be assigned to central department offices. The intended policy of the NADC was to rely on the expertise of local educational institutions in the North.[18]

The core structure of the NADC was initially composed of FAO advisors and several senior Thai officials. Counterparts to the foreign advisors were gradually recruited. In mid-1975, before official civil service positions were assigned to the Centre, the NADC had a professional and clerical staff of about eighty persons. The Research Branch, for example, had twenty members. Of these excluding the FAO advisor, two had master's degrees in agriculture, ten had bachelor's degrees in agriculture or animal husbandry, and seven had diplomas from an agricultural high school.[19] The technical competence of the Centre was thus reasonably assured.

Threat to Line Departments

The proponents of the NADC were highly aware of the difficulties which had confronted the previous regional centres. Despite their efforts to make their organization appear benign, it

[17] Interviews with NADC officials.

[18] Caldwell, *Economic Aid*, p 117; Interviews with NADC officials.

[19] Interviews with NADC officials.

was clear that the NADC was an agency with an activist orientation which possessed the potential for seizing the initiative in determining ministerial policy regarding departmental activities in the North.

Beyond this potential there were indications that the proponents of the NADC actually intended to exert influence over agricultural policy. In the words of the Director of the Centre, for example, the NADC was to be

> . . . the Northern Regional outpost of the MOAC, charged with catalyzing the integrated agricultural development of this region . . . As a catalyst NADC's primary interest is that the work gets done and NADC performs only what cannot be done by any other agency or Department.[20]

The implications of this statement were great regarding the nature of relations between the Centre and other agencies. In the first place the Centre intended to promote projects requiring the participation of a number of departments, and to take on the responsibility of being the directing agency. Moreover, if the other agencies could not (or would not) participate, then the Centre would perform the tasks itself. To do this, of course, the NADC needed the capacity to act independently of the line departments. This independence was implied by the UNDP which viewed the role of the NADC broadly:

> . . . By definition, the role of NADC varies from 'just catalyzing operations' to 'participating in activities' to 'doing the complete job.'[21]

The NADC portended a significant change in the structure of relationships within the ministry. Specifically, it symbolized a change in the Office of the Under-Secretary of State from a passive entity to one which would seek to direct the affairs of the ministry. The symbolic character of the NADC is also reflected in its title. Earlier centres, as well as the NADC in its initial stages, were officially designated as 'offices' rather than as 'centres'. As offices their administrative mandate was more restricted and they were considered to have a somewhat less permanent status than would have been the case were they designated as centres.

Another symbolic feature of the titles of these agencies concerns the use of the word 'research'. All the centres were originally called 'regional agricultural research offices'. Some officials within the ministry claimed that the title signified that these agencies were intended merely to be large research stations, and as such properly belonged under the Department of Agriculture. In light of this attitude and their previous experience, the proponents of the NADC sought a formal title which would imply the posture they wanted for the Centre. Therefore, they campaigned to have their agency designated as an 'agricultural development centre' rather than a 'research office'.[22]

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[20] Krui Punyasing, 'Function and Status of the Northern Region Agricultural Development Centre (NADC)', n.d., p. 2.

[21] UNDP, 'Establishment and Operation', p 8.

[22] In English language documents from 1972 onward the Centre was called the Northern Agricultural Development Centre. Thai language documents continued to call it a research office through 1975.; Krui Punyasingh to Under-secretary of State, Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives, Subject: *Khwam sap son nai ruang lak kan lae withi patipat ngan khong samnaknган wichai kaset phak* [Confusion concerning the principles and methods of operation of the regional agricultural research offices], 6 June 1974.

Support for this change in title was expressed by the Civil Service Commission. The Commission was dissatisfied with the title of 'research office' because it felt that the previous efforts to establish offices with this title had failed and it was reluctant to repeat previous errors. In order to pressure the Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives to correct this defect, the Commission delayed its approval of the staffing request by the NADC.[23]

As noted earlier the proponents of the NADC did not articulate their intentions, or else muted them, to lessen the apprehensions of possible opponents. At one point this approach threatened to severely weaken the Centre before it could begin full-scale operation. In 1974 the Consultative Committee on the Administrative System of the Office of the Prime Minister approved a change in title for the NADC to 'regional agricultural office'. This change resulted from the tactical deemphasis of the research component of the Centre. At the same time the Committee dealt a blow to the intentions of those behind the NADC by stipulating that research budgets and research personnel of the Centre should be transferred to the line departments.[24] Without these funds and personnel the NADC would have been unable to direct or influence the type of research to be conducted in the North, and it would not have been able to offer any benefits to the line departments to induce their cooperation in integrated activities.

The officers and advisers at the NADC were not alarmed at the action of the committee. One source suggested that deemphasizing the research functions was actually a ploy to induce the line departments to accept the principle that the NADC in the North and the centres in other regions were to serve as the co-ordinators of regional agricultural development.[25] There is no doubt that the leadership of the NADC expected to regain these personnel, because in its fiscal 1975 request to the Civil Service Commission for staff allocations the NADC included a large research component, and made elaborate plans for research development in the North.

Structure of the NADC

The organizational structure of the NADC was a major advance over earlier regional agricultural centres. It incorporated a strategy which sacrificed short term gain for long term benefit and helped to insulate the Centre from internal disruption, a problem which kept the Chainat and Tha Phra centres from achieving their objectives. For the first time research, policy and implementation were brought together under a single authority. This was done by relying on personnel assigned directly to the Centre. The actual operation of the Centre did not depend on the participation of the line departments. This approach was appropriate to the period when the Centre was being established because it provided the time for the NADC to develop an operating philosophy and to inculcate this philosophy into

[23] While civil service positions were initially denied to the Centre, it proceeded to acquire a large staff of hired personnel in anticipation that the controversy over the status of the Centre would be resolved.

[24] Thalerng Thamrongnawasawat to Secretary of the Council of Ministers, Subject: *Samnakngan wicai kaset phak* [Regional agricultural research offices], 8 January 1975.

[25] Interviews with NADC officials.

a sizeable body of officials. Nevertheless, the achievement of the long term development objectives of the Centre ultimately requires the participation of the departments.

The NADC was composed of four principal elements: a 'Planning Branch', a 'Research Branch', an 'Extension Branch', and a 'Natural Resources Branch'. Each branch reported directly to the director of the Centre. The following section will examine the implementation strategy of the NADC through the activities of these branches. The Natural Resources Branch was not operating fully at the time this research was conducted. Its staff, however, frequently worked on projects of the other branches. These branches often worked together and much of the following discussion represents a study of their combined efforts.

'AGRIBUSINESS'. From its inception a significant portion of the activities of the NADC were directed to forging a co-operative relationship between the NADC and agribusiness concerns in the North. Export oriented agribusiness has not been a large component of the northern economy, but there is the potential for significant expansion in a number of areas if stable supplies of raw materials can be obtained. The leaders at the NADC saw that if they could service some of the needs of agribusinesses these would then have a stake in the survival of the Centre and would make it more secure in its relations with line departments. Accordingly the leaders of the NADC established a close relationship between the NADC and a newly organized food processing complex which consisted of a dehydrating plant, a canning plant and a fast-freezing plant.

The NADC assumed the responsibility of bringing these businesses to the attention of those farmers who were potential suppliers of raw materials. Serving as an intermediary was a role which was almost mandated by the efforts of the NADC to promote the formation of farmers' groups in the region.

The NADC also worked with three agribusinesses producing vegetable seed for export, and attempted to promote the raising of Irish potatoes for local consumption. It was reported that the individual who wanted to market the potatoes was a personal friend of the Director of the NADC. Reliance on personal contacts to bolster an instrumental relationship can be useful when an organization is becoming established. There is a danger, however, that if the instrumental relationship does not eventually become dominant, the organization may suffer a loss of purpose when the personal contact is broken. In the case of the NADC it was clear that the personal contact was used to mutual benefit.

FARMERS' GROUPS. The NADC played an active role in the formation of farmers' groups throughout the region. This effort had both short-term and long-term objectives. Initially these groups would provide the NADC with an organized constituency which would help to bolster the claims of the NADC to be the major arbiter of agricultural policy in the North. At a later time these groups would also be a mechanism through which agricultural development could be fostered. With a regard to the promotion of linkages between agribusinesses and farmers' groups, however, the NADC worked primarily in the provinces of Chiang Mai and Lamphun. It scheduled meetings with groups in both provinces in conjunction with district level agriculture officers to explain the benefits of contracting

with the companies. Beyond this the NADC sought to educate these farmers about the other activities in which farmers' groups could engage – such as joint purchasing, marketing and acquisition of credit.

Besides these activities, the Centre actively promoted the establishment of a Northern Federation of Farmers' Groups. Members of the Extension Branch of the NADC visited all of the northern provinces within the Centre's territory in order to explain the proposed federation to farmers' groups and to urge them to join the federation.

Representatives of farmers' groups were brought to Chiang Mai periodically to plan for the establishment of the regional federation. The NADC was very involved in the selection of leaders for the federation. For the most part these were the more well-to-do farmers. The choice of this element rather than the poorest among the farmers was prudent since an attempt to deal with the poorest strata would have required considerably greater investment of resources than were available to the NADC during its formative period. The more productive farmers, on the other hand would be a more articulate and resourceful body – able to undertake development activities on their own with the advice and direction of the Centre, but without the need for a major infusion of NADC resources. Two things would result from this orientation to farmers' groups. First, the creation of a client group which made reasonable demands on the capacities of the Centre would help to justify the existence of the NADC. Second, relying on groups able to do many things for themselves would enhance the ability of the Centre to meet their demands, and contribute to building the image of the NADC as a successful organization.

Though the federation may be seen as a creation of the NADC, it was not a mere puppet. In mid-1975 when the organization of the federation was nearly complete, several hundred members of farmers' groups were brought to Chiang Mai at NADC expense for a two-day meeting. The sessions were lively and the farmers attending were not reticent in presenting their views. By late 1976 it was evident that the federation had acquired an existence independent of the NADC.

CREDIT. The Extension Branch of the NADC was in part concerned with finding ways to increase the credit available to farmers in the region. This effort was part of its two-fold strategy of forging linkages with important elements of the private sector in the North to better assure its own survival and of organizing the factors needed for agricultural development. The lack of sufficient credit has been recognized as a major obstacle to increased agricultural production and diversification. A variety of agencies are involved with rural credit. The largest is the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Co-operatives. On the commercial side, the Bangkok Bank has the largest rural credit programme.

The NADC held meetings with representatives of many of the commercial banks, both the branches in Chiang Mai and the central offices in Bangkok. Initially such meetings were to introduce the banks to the farmers' groups and the agribusiness concerns. The Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Co-operatives was not consulted because in the view of the officials at the NADC the bank was excessively slow in approving loans and it required too many approvals before granting a loan.

In addition to facilitating contacts between potential borrowers and lenders, the NADC attempted to offer its good offices in mitigating some of the problems which hinder the extension of agricultural credit. Commercial banks frequently do not have branches below the province level, making it inconvenient both for farmers to request loans and for bank officers to visit farmers. Property records are often inaccurate, so mortgaging is difficult. The default rate for rural loans is also high – estimated by some at 20 per cent.

These factors cause the overhead costs of providing agricultural loans to be high. The NADC sought to help the commercial banks by organizing farmers' groups and it promoted the principle of mutual guarantees, rather than individual property, to secure loans. Since much of the cost of lending comes from the need of the bank to survey each client individually, the NADC proposed that loans be made to groups with group leaders assuming the responsibility for selecting reliable clients. Such a procedure would lessen the contacts required between bank and borrowers and thus permit the bank to deal with a larger group of people.

The NADC had made arrangements with a bank to provide loans to the groups which the NADC had organized for an agribusiness firm. The bank initially agreed to this procedure, but later reorganized these groups into small entities which it felt would be more manageable. One reason for this return to former bank policy may be that the groups formed by the NADC were not legally incorporated, a fact which could complicate the responses of the bank in cases of default.

The role adopted by the NADC in its early phase was that of a 'facilitator' – a promoter rather than a performer. In this regard the Centre had a two-fold orientation. As is indicated by its work with agribusiness firms, farmers' groups and banks, the NADC was committed to private sector participation where practicable. However, in a system with a poorly articulated private sector, such as Thailand, the public sector must often bear a disproportionate share of the development burden. Part II examines the efforts by the NADC to encourage co-ordinated activity in the public sector, and suggests reasons why the NADC, and similar organizations, have only a modest likelihood of success.

Anti-Untouchability Legislation in India

P A JAMES & G SREENIVAS REDDY*

Ameliorative legislation for the the socially underprivileged sections has been an important dimension of inducing social change in India. The present paper attempts to examine the anti-untouchability law which seeks to protect millions of Scheduled Castes living under miserable conditions and constantly subject to various social disabilities.

The Background

It is irony that the Hindu religion claimed as the most tolerant of any on the earth should have given birth to the abnoxious practice of untouchability.[1] The victims of this practice known by the constitutional term Scheduled Castes or the Gandhian epithet 'harijans' numbering 82.5 millions (1971 Census) were subjected to grave injustice and ill-treatment over very many years.[2]

Sporadic efforts in the past to put an end to this practice, by and large, proved to be ineffective. The reason for this appears to be not merely the non-involvement of the state in the fight against 'touch-me-notism' but its alleged support – direct or indirect – for the same.

Though the British rulers felt the need for eradicating untouchability they could not introduce any legislation because the social disabilities of the Harijans were interrelated with various religious practices which perhaps they wanted to leave undisturbed.[3]

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[1] Untouchability broadly refers to the system of belief and practice that the touch of people born in certain communities causes pollution.

[2] Typical of a few of the disabilities suffered by the untouchables were: 'In many places they could not enter at all upon streets or lanes used by the caste Hindus, or else they had to carry a broom to brush away their footprints. In some places they could not contaminate the earth with their spittle but had to carry little pots around their necks, to keep the ground reserved for caste Hindu spittle only . . .' Isaacs, Harold R. *India's Ex-Untouchables*, New York, Harpor and Row Publishers, 1974, pp 27-28.

[3] Revanker, Ratna G. *Indian Constitution: A case study of Backward Classes*, Rutherford, Feirleigh Dickinson University Press, 1971, p 114.

However, the establishment of a nationwide legal system with the norm of equality before the law during the British period extended elementary rights to the untouchables.[4]

The concern for its eradication was on the increase in the pre-Independence days. The activities of the Christian Missionaries helped to eradicate the evil to a significant extent. Gandhi's movement for Harijan uplift and the emergence of Ambedkar as a national leader from the ranks of untouchables gave a boost to the movement for the abolition of untouchability.

Tackling the problem by means of the law was attempted by a few States before Independence resulting in a few enactments banning the practice of untouchability and the disabilities related to it.[5] There was a spurt in the legislative output in the immediate post-Independence years. Many States passed laws in quick succession to fight the evil. Within a short span of three years (1947-1950) almost all the States had anti-untouchability laws on the statute book.[6]

These Acts passed by different States at different times differed widely from one another. Some of them merely dealt with temple entry leaving aside the more important aspects of secular life. Some others were mild in their punitive content and hence were not deterrent enough. Further, there were other areas in the country not covered by any such law.[7] Thus, there was a need for a comprehensive and deterrent all-India law to effectively combat the evil.

The Law (1955)

The Constitution of India Act (1950) was a major advance in the law on untouchability. Article 17 of the Constitution 'abolishes' untouchability and makes its practice in any form a cognizable offence. Article 35 empowers Parliament to make laws prescribing punishment for such offences.[8] Under this provision the Indian Parliament enacted the 'untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955' (UO ACT) which came into force from 1 June 1955.

With the passage of the Act, the initiative for legislation on untouchability, hitherto exercised by states, has now come to rest with the union Parliament. For the first time the Act provided a uniform law with all-India coverage. The Act, with seventeen sections and a Schedule[9] is rather a detailed piece of legislation.

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[4] Galanter, Marc. 'Untouchability and the Law', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol IV, No 1, 1969, p 131.

[5] Notable among such early enactments were those of Travancore-Cochin (1925) Madras (1945), Orissa (1946) and Bombay (1946).

[6] By 1950 there were as many as 21 State Laws dealing with untouchability.

[7] For example Jammu & Kashmir, Assam and part of Punjab were not covered by the Laws banning untouchability.

[8] In addition, Article 46 enjoins the State to protect the Scheduled Castes from injustice and all forms of exploitation. Article 15, 23, 39A also lend support to the prevention of discriminatory practices against Scheduled Castes.

[9] The Schedule contains a list of twenty-one State Laws repealed by Section 17 of the UO Act to the extent they correspond or are repugnant to the said Act.

The following are the salient features of the Act. It provides penalties for offences committed on the grounds of untouchability such as: preventing entry to public places of worship; denying the use of public conveniences – such as roads, wells, water taps, tanks, rivers – etc.; denying access to public places like shops, hotels, hospitals, educational institutions and enforcing occupational, professional or trade disabilities.

The offences under the Act are cognizable. The punishment prescribed ranges up to imprisonment for six months or a fine of five hundred rupees or both. A provision is made for punishment of offences committed not only by individuals but also by companies. Further, persons abetting offences under the Act are also punishable.

Certain features of the Act merit special mention. Firstly, the Act extending to the whole of India brings uniformity in the legislation and avoids the confusion that earlier resulted from the multiplicity of Acts in existence. Secondly, for purposes of effective prosecution the Act places the burden of proof on the accused. Thirdly, the Act is not only applicable to Hindus but also to all other communities in India. Thus it benefits certain sections of Christians and Muslims being treated as untouchables by their fellow believers.

Notwithstanding these merits, the Act suffered from a number of limitations. Neither the Constitution nor the UO Act defined the term 'untouchability'. Even the courts of law have not done this. As a result of this lacuna, the constitutional and statutory guarantee for the abolition of untouchability remains vague. In the *Devarajaiah Vs. Padmanna* case the Mysore High Court observed that in the absence of a clear definition of the term untouchability the cases filed under UO Act amount only to social boycott and that they rarely come under the purview of the Act.[10]

Further, the Act did not specify the minimum punishment for offences. In many cases decided under the Act, the punishment imposed by the courts was so low as two to five days imprisonment or five to ten rupees fine.[11]

Yet another lacuna has been that the Act did not provide for enforcement machinery and the issue was raised during the course of debate on the Untouchability (Offences) Bill in the Parliament. Some members expressed fears that the Act would be reduced to a dead letter because of the lack of enforcement machinery and suggested the appointment of a Board with powers of enforcement. The Union Home Ministry wrote to all the States to make suitable arrangements for enforcing the provisions of the Act. But the States have failed to do the same.[12]

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[10] *Devarajaiah Vs. Padmanna – All India Reporter, 1958 Vol 45, Mysore Section, Para 4, p 85.*

[11] To have an idea as to the nature of punishments awarded by the courts for untouchability offences, see, Report of the Committee on Untouchability, Economic and Educational Development of the Scheduled Castes and connected Documents (Hereafter referred to as Elayaperumal Committee Report), Government of India, 1969, pp 93-98.

[12] No other State except Bihar and Madhya Pradesh appointed Committees to watch the enforcement of the Act. Elayaperumal Committee Report, p 43.

The Law in Operation

A look into the disposal of cases registered under the Act throws light on its working. The details regarding the disposal of cases portrays a disturbing picture. A number of cases registered with the police were not challenged (16.98%). The cases ending in conviction were as low as one-fourth of those registered with the police. The rest were either acquitted (13.39%) or compounded (15.35%) or were pending disposal (28.90%) in the courts of law.

The large number of cases which remains pending indicates the delay involved in their disposal. Delay in their disposal often results in manipulating evidence, threats for withdrawal of cases and other undesirable consequences for the victims confirming the oft quoted adage that 'Justice delayed is Justice denied'.

Many cases were acquitted in the courts either due to insufficient evidence or inability of the victims to secure legal aid or for the fear of adverse consequences for having moved the courts.[13] Producing evidence to prosecute offenders had posed a problem. Caste Hindus are generally reluctant to give evidence in support of Scheduled Caste persons on account of orthodoxy, inhibitions or fear of social boycott.[14] A number of cases resulted in acquittals because all the witnesses were Harijans.[15]

Procedural defects committed by the agencies responsible for enforcement, investigation and prosecution led to the acquittal in a considerable number of cases. These defects occasionally stemmed from the unsympathetic attitude of the bureaucracy and partial ignorance of the provisions of the Act. In this connection it is of interest to record the findings of the Elayaperumal Committeee that 57.9% of the civil servants and 44.0% of Police officials were unaware of the prohibition of untouchability under law.[16]

It is a sad commentary on the working of untouchability legislation that there is no decline in the magnitude of untouchability offences over the years. The incidence of untouchability is far more widespread than the statistics show. In all probability, the number of cases registered with the Police constitute only a small fraction of the actual number. For a number of reasons many incidents of untouchability and other discriminatory practices against Harijans go unregistered with the Police. The victims often stomach the insults heaped on them because of their poverty making them dependent on the very people who perpetrate the insults. They lack resources and time required to fight prolonged legal battles, even if they choose to complain. Added to this, they lack confidence in the bureaucracy[17] which generally reflecting the viewpoint of and subjected to the pressure of caste Hindus, is often inclined to ignore the complaints against untouchability.

The Act was ineffective on account of the low level of awareness among the people. Virtually half of the population of the country was ignorant of the legal ban on

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[13] Report of the Andhra Pradesh Legislature Committee on Welfare of Scheduled Castes, Hyderabad, 1978, p 38.

[14] Elayaperumal Committee Report, p 55.

[15] *Ibid.*

[16] *Ibid., p 43.*

[17] Report of the Andhra Pradesh Legislature Committee, *op. cit.*, p 37.

untouchability.[18] Widespread ignorance of the Act is a pointer to the weakness of the publicity machinery employed for spreading awareness about it.

There was criticism both inside and outside Parliament that the Act was not serving the purposes for which it was enacted. The Government of India, therefore, appointed a committee viz. the Committee on Untouchability, Economic and Educational Development of the Scheduled Castes (1965), popularly known as the Elayaperumal Committee to examine, among other things, the working of the UO Act, 1955.

The Amended Law (1976)

A Bill to amend the UO Act was subsequently introduced in Parliament in 1972. The Act was amended by the Untouchability (Offences) Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1976. The Amended Act, renamed as the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 came into force from 19 November 1976.

The amended Act introduced a number of changes. The State Governments are charged with the duty to ensure that the victims of untouchability are availed the rights accruing from the abolition of untouchability. For this purpose, it contemplates studies for identifying areas with incidence of untouchability; provision of legal aid; setting up special courts for the speedy trial of offences; and establishing committees to facilitate the implementation of such measures. The State Governments are also empowered to impose collective fine on people of an area practising untouchability.

The amended Law prescribes a minimum punishment of a month's imprisonment or a fine of Rs.100/- for offences. The maximum punishment has been raised to a sentence of two years imprisonment and a fine of Rs.1,000/-. Cognizable untouchability offences are made non-compoundable. Cases attracting punishment with imprisonment for less than three months can now be tried summarily. Not only practising but preaching or justifying untouchability on any ground is now a punishable offence.

Conclusion

Barring a few improvements, the legislation in force continues to suffer from a number of inherent limitations like ambiguity in the very term 'untouchability', lack of provision for enforcement machinery, and the mild punitive content. Weak publicity effort, negative bureaucratic disposition, die-hard caste feelings, coupled with poverty and 'culture of silence'[19] of the untouchables have further circumscribed the efficacy of the law. However, fool-proof and stringent the laws may be, their enforcement depends on the existence of a strong and committed executive machinery which in the present case is conspicuous by its absence.

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[18] Finding of the Study of Registrar General of India cited in Elayaperumal Committee Report, pp 74-75.

[19] Expression used by Paulo Freire to denote the ignorance and lethargy of the dispossessed and opressed resulting from the whole situation of economic, social and political domination. Freire, Paulo, Cultural Action for Freedom, Penguin, London, 1977.

Promoting the Use of Local Building Materials in Nigerian housing construction: The Problems and the Prospects

DON C I OKPALA*

Like many urbanized and urbanizing societies, Nigeria is experiencing acute difficulties with the provision of adequate housing for her citizens, especially in the urban centres. The nature and incidence of these difficulties and problems have been fairly widely discussed elsewhere and need not be repeated here.[1] Suffice to say that there us an acute shortage of housing units relative to the demands for them. The consequence is high rent levels, official rent control regulations notwithstanding. In addition to demand pressures, the other major factor in the high cost of housing (even in government housing projects), is the very high import content of building materials. Over 70 per cent by value of the building materials of most urban houses, is imported. The objectives of this paper are to show the magnitude of building materials imports into Nigeria, and the impact of this magnitude on housing production and housing costs; to review the measures and policies being adopted by both the government and the private industrial sector to encourage the use of local building materials; and why these measures are not having much effect. Finally suggestions are made as to the line of policy and practice that could effectively elicit greater popular use of indigenous local materials in housing construction.

Magnitude of building materials Imports

Table 1 shows the production, importation and total consumption of cement in Nigeria 1970-1977. It shows that the country dropped from producing as much as 56 per cent of its total cement consumption in 1970 to producing only about 37 per cent of such consumption in 1977. Although there were continuing increases in the absolute tonnage produced locally between these years, the relative proportion decreased significantly. This can be directly attributed to the massive post-civil war reconstruction and construction programmes, particularly in the public sector – a construction programme of such magnitude that the domestic plants could not cope with the required amount of cement. Consequently, there was the massive importation of cement that virtually paralyzed the country's ports in the mid 1970s.

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[1] "Housing Density Standards: A Constraint on Urban Housing Production in Nigeria', (*EKISTICS* Vol 45 No 270, June 1978; pp 249-257).

Nigeria now has eight cement plants (see Table 2) with a projected production capacity of only 4,515,000 tonnes per annum. Even then, only one or two of these plants as yet produces up to half of its installed capacity. In sum then, most of the cement used in the country is still imported.

Table 1

Domestic Production, Importation and Total Consumption of Cement in Nigeria 1970-1977

1 Year	2 Domestic Production (Tonnes)	3 Importation (Tonnes)	4 Total Consumption (Tonnes)	5* Domestic Production as per cent of total Consumption
1970	596,000	466,000	1,063,000	56.0
1971	644,000	977,000	1,642,000	39.2
1972	1,112,000	721,000	1,833,000	60.6
1973	1,271,051	854,549	2,125,000	59.8
1974	1,222,000	1,045,603	2,267,603	53.8
1975	1,154,200	1,673,227	2,827,427	40.8
1976	1,297,000	2,678,745	3,975,745	32.6
1977	1,550,000	2,654,620	4,204,620	36.8

Sources: (1) Federal Office of Statistics: *Digest of Statistics* (1971, 1972, 1973 & 1974)
(2) N.I.S.E.R. *Report of the Sectoral Study of the Cement Industry in Nigeria Vol 1 (p 57).*
* Column 5 was computed by the author.

Table 3 shows the value of the imports of some selected building materials from 1974-1977. (See details of the building materials concerned in Appendix 1). It shows that this increased from N269.9 million in 1974 to N525.3 million in 1975 and to N564.5 million in 1976. The first six months of 1977 recorded N431.8 million, which indicates that for that year, total import of building materials would be above N850.0 million if the trend of the first six months of that year were continued. This is an enormous outlay on the imports of building materials.

This picture, to a large extent fits into the reports of the ECA Team of Experts on the construction industry and building materials industry[2] that the building industry in most African countries is characterized by:

a a high component of imported raw materials;

[2] Economic Commission for Africa: *First Report of the First Team of Experts on the Construction Industry and Building Materials Industry Development Programme* (Project No 9.293) 7 November 1977 p 7.

b existing indigenous raw materials are not used.

Even in cases where stone or clay is available in large quantities hollow cement blocks produced from imported cement are preferred. Where timber is found in abundance, the manufacture of cement blocks is encouraged.

c Lack of efforts at improving and commercializing traditional building materials.

Table 2

Installed Capacity (Projected) of Nigerian Cement Plants July 1979

(Tonnes per annum)

	Plant	*Capacity*
1	West African Portland Cement Company, Ewekoro	840,000
2	Calabar Cement Company, Calabar	450,000
3	Nigerian Cement Company, Nkalagu	625,000
4	Cement Company of Northern Nigeria, Sokoto	400,000
5	Ukpila Cement Company Ukpila	400,000
6	Sagamu Cement Works, Sagamu	600,000
7	Ashaka Cement Company, Ashaka	600,000
8	Yandeu Cement Company, Yandeu	600,000
	Total National Installed Capacity	4,515,000

Source: NISER Consultancy Services Unit Lagos 1977.

*The retail price of cement soared from N19.0 per tonne in 1972 to a whopping N80.0 per tonne in 1975 – a fourfold price rise.

With the increase in the import content of building goes rises in the cost of housing. This escalated so much in recent years that the Nigerian Federal Government was forced into enacting sweeping rent control laws, which regrettably have not been effective because of the pressure of demand relative to supply. The pattern that emerges then is that of an important sector of the economy, not very much developed, but with a lot of scope for development through import substitution. As far as natural resources are concerned, there is no shortage of raw materials for the production of cement, bricks, lime, asbestos sheets and wood components. Nigeria is therefore in a position to develop its building materials industry and make use of them to offset the enormous outlay on imports. Several justifications can then be made for encouraging the use of local building materials:

i the desirability of reducing the demand for cement;

ii to reduce building costs by reducing imports and transport costs and consequently reducing housing costs;

iii to make for the production of more housing units as materials used would become cheaper and therefore more accessiblee (physically and financially) to a large number of potential builders;

iv the creation of more employment in the country.

Table 3

Value of the Imports of Some Selected Material Inputs into the Building and Construction Industry in Nigeria 1974-1977

Year	Value of Building Materials Import (N million)†
1974	269.9
1975	525.3
1976	564.5
1977*	431.9*

*1977 Figures are for January to June only.

Source: Computed from the December issues of the Nigerian Trade Summary, Published by the Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos.

†*Approx 1.25 Nigerian Naira = £1.00* (Ed).

Use of Local Building Materials as Housing-Cost reducing measure:

One effective way of reducing high housing costs is to encourage the use of local building materials in housing construction. Public policy is already convinced of the efficacy of this measure. Besides reducing the cost of housing construction and therefore hopefully reducing rents; use of locally produced building materials would save substantial foreign exchange for the country. In pursuit of these objectives, the Federal Government of Nigeria has taken a number of measures: Among other things, it has:

1 Planned the establishment of seven clay bricks factories in the country (at Enugu, Jos, Kaduna, Kano, Ibadan, Lagos and Maiduguri) to produce building bricks. Over half of these have actually been completed. The bricks to be produced are envisaged as effectively replacing cement blocks for building and consequently reducing housing construction costs. This is in recognition of the fact that cement is an expensive building material and is out of the reach of the great majority of the people. On the other hand, bricks frequently, though not invariably, appear to be the cheapest alternative for walling as compared to concrete, cement blocks, stone or wood. Besides, good clay for brick production is available in abundant quantities almost everywhere in Nigeria.

Unlike cement blocks, clay bricks require neither rendering nor painting. This attribute in itself is evidently a cost-reducing one. Explaining why the Federal Nigeria Government embarked upon the establishment of these bricks factories, for example, the then Head of State stated that:

'The Government embarked on the brick works projects throughout the Federation when it became obvious that we couldn't meet up with the cement requirements to successfully undertake our housing programme. Then we were looking for all possible ways and means to achieve our objective to shelter a maximum number of our people, but it became almost

impossible to come by cement and we had to invite the Ministry of Mines and Power to do something about it.

It was then suggested that brick factories which would use local materials like clay was going to be the answer and the Ministry consequently undertook to finance the programme'[3]

2 Another government measure to encourage use of local building materials was to severely restrict the export of timber, and other wood products from the country and as well to restrict the importation of timber and plywood into the country. Nigeria is a large producer of timber and wood products and these measures were designed to keep timber and other wood products in the country so that they could be available to the local building industry. The effects of these export and import restrictions on timber can be seen from the fact that the quantity exported decreased by 74.0 per cent from 107,000 cubic metres in 1975 to 28,000 cubic metres in 1976, and 13,000 cubic metres in 1977. The earnings from the commodity commensurably dropped from N4.8 million in 1975 to N1.4 million in 1976 and to N0.5 million in 1977. It is assumed that, much of the wood produced is now used locally in the country.

3 The Government also placed the importation of some other building materials, (among other items), under licence, so as to encourage and protect the production of such materials within the country. Among these materials are:

Plastic Pipes,
Asbestos roofing sheets,
Tubes and pipes of cast iron or steel (not exceeding 8 cm in diameter),
Corrugated galvanized roofing sheets.

The Government explained that this measure was,
'To protect local industries and conserve foreign exchange, and in order to maintain some flexibility to supplement local production, where this is inadequate to satisfy local demand, particularly in respect of basic items'[4]

In addition to these several government measures to encourage production and use of locally produced building materials, the industrial private sector (mainly foreign) is introducing some wood based technologies for housing. Principally, these technologies plan to use wood and wood waste products for manufacturing wood panels for housing.

Advocatees of wood based houses claim that modern timber houses are structurally sound, permanent, aesthetically attractive and blend well into their surroundings.[5] In addition they are said to have the following advantages:

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[3]Part of the Statement of the Nigerian Head of State, General O. Obasanjo at the Commissioning of one of the brick factories at Jos Plateau State on Friday 7 September 1979. (Reported in the *PUNCH NEWSPAPER* of 8 September 1979, p 2.)

[4]Federal Republic of Nigeria: 1979/80 Budget. Statement by the Federal Commissioner for Finance on the 1979/80 Budget.

[5]African Timber and Plywood (Nigeria) Ltd: *Guide to the System Building* (July 1968), p 2.

1 They can be immediately occupied;
2 They can be mass produced;
3 They can be built far quicker than brick or cement block houses;
4 They can be manufactured at low cost.

In addition to sawn timber and plywood, some industrial firms are attempting to introduce industrialized building materials manufactured from wood-wastes. These include wood-cement boards; wood-wool-cement boards; hardboard/fibreboards, particleboards, undulated bituminous pulpboard plates, etc — all of which could be used for housing construction and which as tested elsewhere (principally in Europe) are said to offer outstanding tensile and compressive strength, are weather-, fungus-, termite-proof and fire resistant; as well as having good acoustic and thermal insulation properties. The adoption of these products will involve the introduction of the industrialized building system and setting up of factories to produce custom-made wood panels for housing construction. In addition to the African Timber and Plywood Factory at Sapele, a new medium wood complex factory is planned near Ibadan which will primarily use wood wastes to produce wood based building products.

As a substitute to cement as a conventional walling material too, the use of stabilized soil blocks or landcrete are being encouraged. Given proper adaptation to local conditions, stabilized soil blocks are envisaged to be cheaper than Cement blocks; or even bricks.

These several measures and efforts are going on at both official and unofficial levels to popularize the use of local building materials and reverse the present heavy dependence on high cost imported materials. Success in this regard cannot yet be said to be certain. Certain problems – social, technological legal and economic, still inhibit the popular adoption or readoption of these now non-conventional materials for building, which may require prolonged mass education by applied demonstrations to remove.

The Problems of Acceptability

In spite of the great and commendable efforts being made at official levels to popularize the use of indigenous and locally produced building materials, some problems still inhibit the acceptance or reacceptance of these materials for buildings. These problems include:

1 Social or Status Unacceptability of Some of these Materials

Nigeria has undergone some degree of modernization and made some degree of progress at the national, group and individual levels. Certain parameters have been set, albeit informally or unconsciously, as measures for this process of modernization and progress. One of these is the erection of 'modern' houses. A modern house, nowadays is generally a house of cement blocks with corrugated iron roofing. Most people who are in a position to build houses will not consider building them with stabilized soil or mud blocks, bricks and much less consent to build houses with wood as walling materials. In the social eyes, building with these traditional local materials would be taken to mean that the individuals concerned have not improved or made progress in their lives. The social unacceptability of the use of traditional local building materials is for example, illustrated in the public attitude towards the 1976 Oyo State Government demonstration of low cost housing using

local building materials.[6] The materials used were land-crete or mudblocks for the walls, coconut or palm tree timber as rafters, and galvanized corrugated iron sheets for the roofing. This demonstration in housing construction was meant to show to the public that it was possible through use of readily available local materials in preference to imported materials, to build decent houses at reasonable costs.

Three models of houses were constructed in the experiment.

— a two-bedroom, a three-bedroom and a four-bedroom house which cost N3,700; N4,200 and N4,520 respectively. These houses were considered relatively inexpensive as the same types and sizes of houses if built by a contractor and using 'modern' conventional contruction materials, equipment and methods, would cost about N12,500, N15,600 and N22,100 respectively[7]

The public was expected to make use of the opportunity offered and turn to local materials in building construction.

Many people went to see these model low cost houses. Many commended the efforts and concern of the state government in thinking about how to solve the housing problem. But many wondered aloud why if the government thinks such houses are that good, it does not build houses with such materials for its civil servants. 'If it is as good as they claim it to be, why don't they build and live in such houses'. Strengthening this feeling is the fact that town planning laws currently do not allow the use of landcrete and/or mud blocks for house construction in the urban areas, much less in the state capital city of Ibadan where these model houses were put up. In fact if it were an individual who attempted to build a house with landcrete in that part of Ibadan, the building would not have been approved or would be demolished if contructed. Clay bricks or mud or stabilized soil block buildings are popularly considered inferior to sandcrete (cement block) buildings. They are also considered less secure and relatively unsafe.

The result of the general non-patronage of local building materials is that some of the brick factories established are now producing large quantities of bricks but are hardly getting many people to buy their product. The factory at Okigwe in Imo State for example, now has large stockpiles of bricks that cannot be disposed of, this resulting in the factory radically scaling down production because of lack of storage space. The consultant's report[8] on this factory had rightly observed that

'The competition between ceramic and cement wall-building materials does not allow a free market. Government therefore has to regulate cement consumption . . . In order to give the necessary acceleration in the production and sales of ceramic building materials, specially for wall construction, the government will hve to face the problems regarding the acceptance of ceramic materials by the public and the availability of required skills for the construction industry'

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[6]The Western Nigeria Housing Corporation; Ibadan: *Low Cost Homes: An Experiment*. (See also Onibokun, A. G. 'Low Cost Housing: An Appraisal of an experiment in Nigeria' *Jour. of Administration Overseas*, Vol XVI, April 1976, pp 114-120.

[7]Onibokun, A. G. *Ibid*. (p 115).

[8]Bereuschot-Moret-Bosboom: *Feasibility Study of Clay Building Materials in East Central State: Economic Background and Market Analysis* (p 6) (Prepared for the Ministry of Economic Development and Reconstruction, East Central State of Nigeria, September 1975).

Although some of the wood materials are certified to be fungus- and termite-proof, it is not certain that they retain these attributes with certain local fungi or termites; nor are some of these materials really effectively weather-proof. The local treatment of wood against these problems is still not very effective and large-scale warping of wood is still a common experience. In certain areas, anti-termite chemicals have proved ineffective.

2 TECHNOLOGY PROBLEMS

The use of certain wood panels and other wood-based materials like wood-cement boards; wood-wool-cement boards; hardboard/fibreboards, require relatively sophisticated and subtle skills which are not commonly available. They may therefore require special skilled construction labour which is relatively in short supply. This may result in higher construction labour costs than in conventional cement block housing. This high cost requirement may offset the savings made by patronizing local building materials. The current opinion of the people, about the worth of asbestos roofing sheet can be used as an illustration of an aspect of the technology problem. There are now a number of asbestos cement plants in the country producing roofing sheets. Not many construction workers know how to roof effectively with asbestos sheets. The result is that many of the asbestos sheet roofed houses begin to leak before very long as a result of poor quality workmanship. The people however attribute this problem of leakages to the inferiority of asbestos roofing rather than to the poor workmanship of the construction workers which in fact it is responsible. Erroneous as their beliefs are, it remains very difficult to convince most people otherwise. Of course, repeated patching of the roof adds to the costs.

The shortage of construction labour is also now very evident in mud or stabilized block and bricks housing. Most of the current building labour pool are trained on the cement block construction.

Apart from the technology of construction however, there is the deeper problem of cutural adaptability of the potential users to such houses as those walled with cheaper locally-produced materials. The indurability may come into question when the character of the occupiers particularly the children, and the level of maintenance of such buildings by their owners are considered.

3 LEGAL PROBLEMS

There are the legal problems of Town Planning laws and some local government by-laws prohibiting the use of certain indigenous building materials, particularly in urban centres. Present building regulations and codes therefore are a constraint on their use. These building regulations and codes need urgent revisions and modifications to permit the use of these materials.

4 THE PROBLEMS OF UNCERTAIN COST ECONOMIES

One of the advantages attributed to the use of local building materials is cheapness in the materials themselves and in their construction labour. But this cost economy is not immediately obvious with all the materials being suggested.

The use of industrialized building system materials based on wood (wood-cement boards, wood-wool cement boards etc) may not be as cheap as is being suggested. For one thing

they are industrial products requiring specialized skilled labour for production as well as for use in house building. As such specialized labour is still in short supply, the enhanced labour costs in works construction may tend to offset the savings gained in the cost of the materials themselves. This also applies in the use of clay bricks for construction. As also pointed out by Berenschot-Moret-Boshoom,[8] 'the government will have to face the problems regarding the acceptance of ceramic materials by the public *and the availability of required skilled labour for the construction industry*'. The problem in the case of bricks stems from the fact that the generation of building labour that was trained in the use of bricks and mudblocks has passed and the present generation is just being resocialized into them.

The Prospects

The policy efforts of the government in encouraging and trying to popularize the use of local building materials are steps in the right direction and should be continued. For social status and technological reasons, this redirection is not being enthusiastically accepted by the mass of the people. Reversion to the use of indigenous local building materials is generally considered a backward move away from modernity and is as yet unacceptable. There is nothing that the government can do *directly* in the short run to effectively force the use of local materials in preference to the conventional modern (but largely imported) building materials. The government can effectively do a lot *indirectly* to win the people back to the use of local building materials. Some of this it is already doing, that is establishing local building materials industries. In addition, the government should make it a matter of policy to use local materials in the construction of all or most of its own buildings – public buildings and other institutional buildings. In fact, using these materials in public or institutional buildings alone will not do. It won't convince many. The government should also use such materials in the construction of official residential houses for its officials, as well as in the construction of other government-sponsored housing schemes. It should, as well, enforce the same policies with all buildings by its agencies and by parastatals e.g. the housing corporations or housing Authorities.

The government's use of local building materials will have at least two desirable effects:

1 It will significantly relieve the pressure on the demand for cement and other imported building materials, as government imports and use of these materials account for a substantial proportion of their total. This measure will not only reduce the cost of government sponsored housing (which at present is very high) but may also reduce the cost of cement generally following the fall in its demand.
2 Secondly and more importantly, the demonstration effects of their use in various government schemes and projects will go a long way to convincing ordinary people and builders that these materials are as good, if not better than the imported materials.

Since the government and its agencies are actively (indeed massively) participating in housing construction activities, they can most effectively help in popularizing the use of local building materials by using them in their own housing construction.

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[8] *Ibid.*

Appendix 1

Value of the Imports of some selected Material inputs into the Building and Construction Industry in Nigeria from 1974-1977

Commodity	VALUE (N)			
	1974	1975	1976	1977*
1 (a) Veneer Sheets —	81,926	161,812	158,649	341,409
(b) Plywood including veneered panels	41,066	1,249,889	4,616,351	6,117,938
2 (a) Lime	1,054,461	1,373,348	1,808,801	1,712,711
(b) Cement	34,800,560	71,148,009	73,016,215	103,471,558
(c) Tiles	202,351	380,121	701,042	469,737
(d) Asbestos Cement	1,946,628	3,444,047	5,791,573	6,670,669
(e) Cement Clinker	540,602	3,248,317	4,642,054	3,602,136
(f) Asbestos Cement pipes	37,482	367,323	1,491,849	772,295
3 (a) Refractory bricks and Other Refractory material	1,968,424	2,942,109	2,656,317	6,951,925
(b) Building bricks	51,032	58,897	325,218	162,451
(c) Roofing tiles	158,451	190,937	183,249	227,064
(d) Piping Conduits	30,252	57,974	7,150	6,468
4 GLASS	3,990,391	5,141,281	8,227,812	5,598,332
5 (a) Pig Iron including cast iron	7,126	29,592	7,570	8,659
(b) Iron and steel powder short and sponge	743,488	196,482	5,060	24,385
6 (a) Puddled bars and pilings blocks	63,419	68,179	137,183	694,766
(b) Ingots of iron or steel	390,474	47,305	174,035	56,074
(c) Blooms billets slabs sheet bars and rodly forced pieces or iron or steel	15,201,290	10,041,796	10,482,834	5,816,630
(d) Iron or steel coils for re-rolling	116,715	1,547,809	1,090,131	501,225
(e) Blanks for tubes and pipes	865,262	13,202,406	5,992,526	2,495,065
(f) Wire rod of iron and steel	2,793,267	9,745,385	14,200,268	6,331,750
(g) Bars and rod including wire rod of iron or steel, hollow mining drill steel	26,157,840	59,498,049	49,526,958	25,424,929
7 Universal plates and sheet of iron or steel	43,415,541	67,094,775	141,417,127	80,423,000
8 Iron and steel wire	6,757,417	8,210,914	15,053,481	6,116,747
9 Tubes, pipes and fittings of iron or steel	88,709,906	164,364,045	81,285,930	55,462,131
10 Iron and steel castings and forgings unwired	672,909	1,459,326	1,339,420	1,888,628
11 Aluminium and aluminium (a) Alloys unwrought	797,576	2,298,565	4,624,067	2,254,864
(b) bars, rods, angles, shapes, sections and wire of aluminium	2,769,981	3,271,073	3,668,510	2,126,925
(c) Plates, sheets and strip of aluminium	7,659,804	23,769,140	36,813,160	25,622,083
12 Steel doors, doors and window frames	1,066,564	3,764,446	4,662,543	14,203,095
(b) Aluminium doors, doors and window frames	467,635	2,500,894	3,864,829	2,010,244
(c) Other steel structural parts and constructions	7,659,804	23,769,140	36,813,160	25,622,083
(d) Other aluminium structural parts and constructions	913,579	2,215,270	5,656,207	3,128,889
13 Wire cables ropes painted (a) bands shings and similar article not insulated	4,728,647	13,181,957	11,176,259	20,339,435
(b) Wire of iron or steel of types used for fencing	139,089	808,180	1,149,150	272,010
(c) Gauge netting grills fencing etc of wire	1,379,043	2,448,274	3,507,715	1,191,770
14 (a) Roofing nails	1,236,944	1,592,912	2,771,718	1,834,860
(b) Other nails, tacks, staples and similar articles	799,825	2,769,580	5,215,127	3,283,941
(c) Nuts, bolts, screws, rivets, washers etc	4,439,504	7,038,065	10,619,718	7,214,505
15 (a) Sinks, wash basins, bidets, baths etc of ceramic materials	3,137,666	6,727,499	5,802,107	3,922,958
(b) Sinks, wash basins, bidets, baths etc of iron and steel	1,889,601	3,928,097	3,811,138	1,902,941
	269,883,542	525,353,219	564,489,848	431,883,167*

Source: Computed from the December issues of the Nigerian Trade Summary, Published by the Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos.

Note: 1977 figures are for January to June only.

Quarterly Notes

CENTO SEMINAR – **Increasing Productivity of Small Farms**

INCREASING THE PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY OF SMALL FARMS
REPORT ON THE CENTO SEMINAR, LAHORE, 1978

The papers presented give much useful data on agricultural developments in Turkey, Pakistan and Iran but the record shows that there was insufficient time to discuss in sufficient depth such a complex of related topics – agronomic and social constraints and research, extension, education, marketing, credit etc. – or to relate them fully to national policies. This resulted in recommendations which are admitted to be less than specific.

Much time was taken, as at many Seminars, in reading aloud and in full some 25 papers, many lengthy. To circulate long papers beforehand and allow only brief oral summaries of key points, to start discussions, would be much more efficient.

In particular it was regrettable than many of the issues to which Professor Glenn Johnson of Michigan State addressed himself in an excellent keynote address could not be fully explored.

An important conclusion was that not all small farmers can be helped by keeping them in agriculture. The cost of accepting this, re-distribution policies etc, was accepted but the theme was little developed.

There was concern about the lack of success of existing programmes and recognized was the importance of multidisciplinary adaptive research into relevant technologies (and its locational specificity) and the need to develop better programmes. Also stressed was the benefit from maximum participation by small farmers in agricultural development.

The recommendation that Regional Institutes and Study and Planning Groups should be established reflects a conflict which was often apparent in the discussions. If farmers are to really participate in development planning and management, adaptive research, training etc (and by doing so, make them much more effective) *de-centralization* is essential.

The problems arising from populations doubling every 23-28 years in the Region and what might be done were not directly discussed. (Specially contributed)

INTERNATIONAL – **Congress on Administrative Problems**

XVIIIth International Congress of Administrative Sciences
Date and Place: Madrid, Spain, 30 June – 4 July 1980

Theme: Responses of Public Administration to the Challenges of Contemporary Societies.

The main purpose of the Congress is to study the major administrative problems which are arising at the end of the twentieth century in the industrialized, socialist, and developing countries, as also in international organizations. The Congress is being held shortly before international conferences on the establishment of a New International Economic, Social and Cultural Order and on the Strategy for the coming Development Decade.

The theme of the Congress will be examined under four subject headings:
1 The Significance of the Rule of Law in Modern Administration.
2 Problems of Political Control of Government Departments and other Public Agencies.
3 The Characteristics Required in Tomorrow's Public Servants.
4 The Development of Planning Techniques in Administrative Systems.

Preliminary Conferences
Before the Congress, three preliminary Conferences will take place from 26 to 28 June:
1 Alcala de Henares – International Association of Schools and Institutes of Administration.
2 Barcelona, on Administration and Regionalism.
3 Madrid, on Integrated Budgeting Systems.

Further information may be obtained from the International Institute of Administrative Sciences, rue de la Charité, 25; B – 1040 Brussels, Belgium.

Book Reviews

The Management of Squatter Upgrading, DAVID PASTEUR, *Saxon House,* 1979; diagrams, illustrations, appendices, bibliography; pp 232; £11.50.

This is a case study of rare thoroughness and detail which should be useful for anyone involved in the promotion and planning or implementation of local development projects and programmes. It is an analysis and evaluation of the management of the upgrading of unauthorized settlements that sprang up around Lusaka at Independence, in the same way, and for the same reasons that Salisbury (as we still know it) and other major towns in Zimbabwe are about to be encircled. (As the author reports, Lusaka's population trebled in the first seven years of independence and half the city's population were living in what most people misleadingly call 'shanty-towns' or 'bidonvilles' ten years later – most of them as squatters on unauthorized and unrecognized plots). Although obviously and immediately relevant to Zimbabwe, whose cities, anyway, are about to be invaded by swarms of development experts as well as by tens of thousands of rural people seeking security and better opportunities, this study is of very wide and general interest for those able to distinguish general principles from particular practices.

The author points out parallels with some recent British experience of neighbourhood improvement programmes but I think many readers will agree with me that he is too modest – many of the issues discussed are those faced by any agency promoting and managing improvement or 'up-grading' projects. Five management issues are singled out for detailed discussion:

'. . . the description and analysis of the main chapters will be brought together in a discussion of a number of management issues which are illustrated by the study. These are:—

— the creation of an institutional framework for integrated and co-ordinated physical and social development

— the development of a corporate and participative internal management structure and style

— the development of a management process capable of achieving project effectiveness and efficiency

— the development of effective communication with responsiveness to, and action by the client community

— the development of a capacity for organizational change and development.'

While this is a particular case and acknowledging that every complex situation is unique so no package of highly specific operations can be successfully copied, it is as good an illustration of these and other issues which are common to many, if not to all contexts.

The limitations of any case study that is documented well enough to be useful is that the field must be very strictly limited. David Pasteur sets out his terms of reference with exceptional clarity:

While the main concern of the study is management, at the same time it offers a description of the project and the particular physical and social approaches adopted which is intended to be informative. Alternatives and policy issues are mentioned where appropriate, but it is not the aim to evaluate or criticize the approach to upgrading as a solution to problems of urban housing, urban planning, economic development or social development. Whatever its merits or demerits in these respects, the project can already claim to have achieved a significant degree of success both in physical and social terms, and it offers a good example of an approach to urban development through partnership between government and the community. The emphasis of the study will be on the upgrading component of the projects, first because it is this which has the most significant implications for management, and secondly because at the time the fieldwork was undertaken, the site and services component had not proceeded beyond the stage of site development. While the infrastructure development aspects of site and services are comprehended within the description of project programming and execution, management of the settlement and subsequent stages of development are not included.

This admitted and necessary lack makes the case study inevitably inconclusive. I urge the publishers to complement this study with others that will provide us all with a complete picture and the opportunity to draw conclusions. The author does provide a bibliography including references to a small number of documents dealing with different aspects of the same programme. The value of the present work would be greatly increased, however, if similar case studies were available on, for instance, the policy-making and planning phases leading up to the projects which would show how the radical changes tantalizingly oulined in the Introduction actually came about.[1]

In my own view, the underlying and overarching issue raised by this case study is one that the author only acknowledges indirectly. As he writes in the Introduction to the final chapter (11: Management and Institution-building for Squatter Up-grading): 'This study

[1]Of special importance and very great general interest would be an analysis and evaluation of the physical, socio-economic and community aspects of the developments – Richard Martin and Robert Ledogar have prepared very useful but still relatively sketchy texts, the most useful of which are not published. Michael Safier and others of the Development Planning Unit, University College, London, have also made detailed studies that are also accessible only to those that already know of them and can go to the few shelves where copies are kept. No doubt some readers will note that all these are European names, as are all mentioned in the bibliography. In fact, I have only come across one publication on the projects by an African: Harrington Jere's excellent but very brief paper, *Squatters Up-Grading: A Policy Put Into Practice* (published in the inaccessibly expensive two volumes of papers edited by Dakhil, Ural and Tewfik: Housing Problems in Developing Countries, Proceedings of the IAHS International Conference, 1978: John Wiley & Sons.

has attempted to describe the way in which HPU (the Housing Project Unit) has developed a management system for the purpose of undertaking a particular type of urban development project.' I cannot therefore fault the author for not discussing the significance, desirability and large-scale, long-term feasibility of this particular type of project, let alone of government sponsored and managed projects and programmes in general. I would mislead readers of this review, however, if I left them with the impression that this is an unequivocally useful study because I find no fault within its stated terms of reference. Aware that I am writing this from a minority viewpoint I must nevertheless offer the opinion that it is wrong to take housing and neighbourhood projects and programmes for granted – that improvements are normally or naturally carried out by public agencies, with or without the participation of private enterprise, community or household 'self-help'.

It is only during the past few decades that the notion of housing people has overtaken the traditional idea, still general among the wealthy of the wealthy nations and the poor as well as the wealthy of the poor nations, that one houses oneself. Not, of course, in the extreme sense of building one's own house unless forced to do so by circumstances or unless (as some do) prefer to do so. The usual way in which homes neighbourhoods are built, or were everywhere until quite recently, is quite different from the kind of system described in this book. As David Pasteur observes, the particular way in which the Lusaka settlement up-grading projects are managed is one of several by which various complementary sets of operations can be co-ordinated – in this particular case by setting up the above-mentioned Housing Project Unit as a special *ad hoc* department of the local authority (the Lusaka City Council). The alternatives would have been to co-ordinate existing agencies through a joint committee or board, or of administering the project through an existing agency or department (with inadequate resources and established procedures that would not have been appropriate for the innovative project). All three alternatives are varieties of government housing provision or supply through an administrative superstructure whose task, as so well described in this case study, is to fit all the pieces together into a viable package: the land, the public utilities, the community facilities, the dwellings (or, at least, the materials, tools and skills with which the households can build for themselves) and the complementary financial and administrative sub-systems. Centrally administered housing projects and programmes are not new, of course; the Pharaohs built self-contained villages for labourers working on their tombs, for instance, but these were exceptions until very recently – and still are in all but the most highly institutionalized countries. The vast majority of places were and still are built and managed by more or less autonomous persons, associations and enterprises that negotiate with each other to provide and use the various and more or less independently variable components of a neighbourhood. David Pasteur does refer to my own very sketchy distinction between hierarchic and heteronomous 'top-down' systems and networks of autonomous agents through which places are built 'from the bottom up' – but he refers to these as extremes, suggesting that the Lusaka project is a mean of some kind by virtue of the participation of the residents mainly through the organization of the one-party state.

This review is not the place to pursue this set of implied issues but I hope to follow subsequent discussions. From a policy and planning position it seems to me that the vital question is whether or not the kind of project described is replicable and sustainable on a

scale that can effectively direct housing and local development with available administrative and not financial resources.

JOHN TURNER

Leadership in Fiji, R. R. NAYACAKALOU; *Oxford University Press, 1967;* index; pp 170; £11.25.

'Leadership in Fiji' is based upon a doctoral thesis presented at London University in 1963. The manuscript, which Dr Nayacakalou was revising for publication at the time of his death in 1972, has been brought to publication under the editorship of Professor Ron Crocombe of the University of the South Pacific. An epilogue by Mr J. N. Kamikamica, Dr Nayacakalou's successor as Manager of the Fijian Native Lands Trust Board, outlines the major changes in the Fijian Administration and Fijian society in general since Dr Nayacakalou's research, which was carried out in the early 1960s.

Despite the passage of time, the central problem to which Nayacakalou addressed himself, the relationship between traditional authority and modern leadership, is still important and the careful generality of his analysis makes his conclusions applicable to present day activities and events. Indeed it is exemplary social science, eschewing global theorizing about the 'third world leadership process' or 'the functions and dysfunctions of traditional leadership systems' in favour of an attempt to understand problems which, while not merely academic for Nayacakalou, are treated with clear objectivity. In 1947, for example, despite a brilliant academic record, Nayacakalou was denied a scholarship for overseas study on the grounds that he was not of chiefly birth. Yet, whatever he may have felt personally about decisions such as this, Nayacakalou provides a balanced appraisal of traditional authority, which gives due recognition both to its strengths and the problems it encounters with social change.

Traditional authority, he recognizes, 'even its modern form, emerges as a tightly organized, authoritarian system which makes for great efficiency in certain contexts'. His analysis of the structural basis and traditional framework of leadership is probably the best part of the book and invaluable to anyone who wants to undertand Fijian traditional organization. Too often, generalized accounts of Fijian social structure try to explain it as a simple mix of Melanesian and Polynesian elements, which are presumably pure, rather than as a distinct range of social forms with a common identity. Others have attempted to apply terms such as phratry, clan or confederation to Fijian words for social groups such as *mataqali* or *yavusa*. Nayacakalou, on the other hand, provides a new interpretation which clarifies a great deal of confusion surrounding these groups, especially that arising out of Native Lands Commission attempts to codify customary land tenure. 'The structure of Fijian socio-political groups may usefully be viewed as primarily a territorial organization, within which there are small groups whose basis of recruitment is patrilineal descent, coupled with adoption and with purely political connections of various sorts'. The Native Lands Commission proceeded on the assumptions that descent was patrilineal and that named groups were descent groups and therefore patrilineages. Such reasoning, Nayacakalou says, provided a 'framework in terms of which Fijian land titles can be organized and

standardized' but the students of traditional leadership should 'begin by observation rather than the records of the Commission'. An observer asking hypothetical questions about traditional groups cannot be sure that the answers he gets are not just guesses at what is in the NLC records.

In explaining how leaders are selected Nayacakalou presents the major principles which govern a wide variety of circumstances, from the smallest village or *yavusa* to the largest *matanitu*. Observers have often felt a need to explain that Fijian leadership combines features of achievement and ascription, a habit which tempts the reductionist use of the irrelevant Melanesian/Polynesian dichotomy. Nayacakalou, however, provides a clear account of principles which are distinctively Fijian.

At the time he was writing, Nayacakalou had to come to terms with the institutions of the Fijian Administration that were established by Ratu Site Lala Sukuna in the 1940s and largely abolished in 1966 (partly as a result of a report prepared by Nayacakalou). In criticizing the Fijian Administration Nayacakalou was tending to side with a number of foreign experts, whose views were often conveyed abroad as unfortunate caricatures. The Conservative Bow Group, for example, spoke of Fijians as 'handicapped by a Fijian tribal system in which each village is run on a communal basis under the control of a hereditary chief'. (Bow Group pamphlet 1962) Nayacakalou, however, makes a clear distinction between traditional authority and the Fijian Administration which was said to be based upon it. 'There are only two forms of leadership among Fijians: the traditional and the non-traditional but between these two lies a third type which looks like a cross between them, which is, in fact, a modern bureaucracy which derives much of its strength from some elements of the traditional system'. The problem this created was that the chiefly bureaucrats 'were expected to be leaders, where in practice they could not be more than administrators'.

In amplifying these general points Nayacakalou employs interesting field material to describe the manner in which the roles of bureaucrat and traditional leader are often contradictory and require 'various techniques of personal accommodation' to avoid conflict. He speculates that 'although the Fijian Administration has tended to bolster their position, it is questionable whether they need this support and they may be better off being only 'leaders' and not also 'bureaucrats'". This has proved to be so, perhaps even more than he suspected. Democratically elected Provincial Councils (which Nayacakalou favoured) attracted little support or interest until they called upon the appropriate chiefs to organize projects along traditional lines. Such undertakings have carefully recognized the distinction between traditional and non-traditional organization while linking them together in ways going beyond 'personal accommodation'.

The 'emergent leadership' which Nayacakalou saw developing in democratically organized voluntary associations has failed to displace traditional sentiments in the political arena. The Governor-General, the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister are all men of high traditional rank, although all are products of the old system of chiefly preferment. The question of who will succeed them, for which the questions asked by Nayacakalou, if not the answers given, are of vital relevance today, is one that exercises the minds of many Fijians.

JOHN NATION

Cities of Peasants: The Political Economy of Urbanisation in the Third World, BRYAN ROBERTS; *Edward Arnold;* pp 168; £2.95.

This volume, the first in a series dealing with 'explorations in urban analysis' under the general editorship of H J Dyos and R E Phal, was mainly written when the author was visiting the Department of Sociology, the University of Texas at Austin, USA. No information is provided about the author, although it is possible to deduce from references in the text and his earlier publications that he has had Latin American experience from the late 1960s, and has either worked or carried out research in Guatemala and Peru.

The volume, which has an introduction in which the author sets out briefly its purpose, is divided into seven chapters under the headings 1) urbanization and underdevelopment, 2) urbanization and underdevelopment before the modern period, 3) urbanization and industrialization, 4) migration and the agrarian structure, 5) urban economy and social stratification, 6) urban poverty and coping with urban life, and 7) urbanization and marginality in underdevelopment, each chapter ending in a summary of the arguments presented by the author. Constant reference is made throughout the text to the views and comments of other authors, and there is an extensive bibliography as well as subject and author indexes.

The main purpose of the book is to examine the expansion of capitalism in underdeveloped countries which form part of the capitalist system, the aim being to show how the form of economic expansion that occurred in Europe from the 16th century onward has shaped the patterns of growth in underdeveloped areas of the world. The focus is on urbanization, as it is the increasing concentration of population in urban areas and in non-agricultural employment that is often seen as a necessary condition of economic development.

Although the title of the book would seem to indicate a concern with the Third World as a whole, few references are made to countries in Asia and Africa, and the volume concentrates almost entirely on Latin America, the most capitalist of all regions. In the interest of potential readers, this should have been made clear in the title. Attention is focused on four Latin American countries with different patterns of economic development – Argentine, Brazil, Mexico and Peru, as well as on the contrasing cases of Britain and the United States which, in different ways, became the powers that from the ninteenth century onwards most deeply affected the Latin American region.

The author first examines the different ways in which the link between urban growth and economic development is conceived, suggesting that the most convincing framework for analysis is that of the economic interdependency of nations and of regions within nations. The potential of any one area, such as its urban or industrial growth, is formed by its position within a wider world economic system. Yet in spite of the importance of external factors in limiting economic development, the major force for change within developing countries is their internal economic growth, taking different forms in different countries, and bringing new social and political forces into play. These forces affect the development of political institutions and class organization which, in their turn, determine the character of urban growth.

An examination is made of the changes in the pattern of urbanization in developing countries resulting from their increasingly close economic relationship with the advanced capitalist countries, contrasting the type of urbanization present in colonial Latin America with that which resulted from much closer integration into the European and North American economies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and noting the radical effects of industrialization on the agrarian structure and the increasing concentration of economic activities in a few metropolitan centres.

The author stresses that it is the dominant pattern of contemporary economic growth based on industrialization which prevents more even and rapid agrarian development, and encourages urban migration. Economic growth concentrates on the large-scale sector of the urban economy which offers the best profits, salaries and wages, but which also makes use of the small-scale sector as a reserve of unskilled and casual labour, as a means of putting out work, and of providing cheaply services such as transport, commerce and repairs – all of which helps make easier the expansion of the large-scale sector.

This dualistic structure is due at least in part to the growing importance of the state in the economy, which acts to foster rapid economic growth, at the expense of investment in social infrastructure. The poor majority, fragmented ideologically and concerned with their own immediate economic interests, remain necessary and active but underprivileged and unincorporated members of urban populations in developing countries.

This volume, misleadingly described as 'introductory' in its opening sentence, adds to the rather bewildering amount of literature, resulting from studies into aspects of development in the Third World, much of which is likely to remain unknown to and unread by those concerned with Third World issues but who, like the reviewer, are not academics. It confirms the unique character and complexity of each political and geographical situation, highlights the lack of agreement which exists between many of those engaged in planning and development studies of this nature, and offers little in the way of practical guidance to those in the Third World seeking answers to the day-to-day problems with which they are confronted. However, the book, with its well-developed arguments and numerous detailed references to the work and views of others, makes interesting and convincing, though rather heavy reading, and is likely to prove particularly useful to those similarly engaged in research and education.

GEORGE FRANKLIN

Co-operatives and Rural Developments: A Case Study of a District Co-operative Central Bank in India, D Ravindra Prasad; *Booklinks Corporation, Nar Ayanguda, Hyderabad, India;* index; pp 208; £8.00.

This is a detailed study of an institution which plays a key role in making credit available through Co-operatives in India. It shows what went wrong and it makes down-to-earth suggestions for improvement.

The government dominated but was ill-equipped to do so helpfully. There was no senior officer in the State Secretariat with adequate knowledge of Co-operatives. The officers nominated to the Bank Board did not often find time to attend. Those deputed to head the staff of the bank arrived with very little knowledge of banking and were transferred before they had acquired it. In their brief tenure of office, they concentrated primarily on trying to ensure that the required returns were made. They blocked the promotion of the bank's own employees and their presence gave an undeserved cloak of respectability to the activities of the bank's President.

The President was one of the only two people who usually spoke at board meetings. He appointed those staff who were not on deputation from governmental and decided who should be promoted or sent for training. He presided at staff conferences. One reason for his power was that the bank had a secretary responsible for banking operations and an executive officer responsible for administration rather than a single manager with overall responsibility.

It is often said that such banks are strangled by bureaucracy. This book gives facts and figures. Three agencies were doing almost identical ritualistic inspections of the bank. A supervisor at circle level had 17 returns to make. A farmer had to sign a loan application in 15 places and collect six signatures from the supervisor. The name of the society had to be written nine times on the application form. Mr Ravindra Prasad traced documents such as applications for registration on their way through the machinery. He found long delays, some corruption and very little checking either of the contents of the form or its relation to reality. Potential village level activists would probably be frightened off by the bureaucracy unless they were beguiled by the opportunity it offered to some for receiving bribes.

Targets for staff were fixed without consultation and without regard to the prospects for the crops on which their fulfilment would depend. A single due date for loan repayments was chosen to make administration of the bank easier, although the date of issue of the loans varied widely. It was sometimes delayed till the peak agricultural season when it caused maximum inconvenience to the voluntary workers in the Primary Societies.

One cannot say that a Co-operative method of giving credit was failing: it was not being tried. One virtue of lending to a proper Co-operative is that the members put pressure on those who do not repay because a poor repayment record may mean that none gets a loan next time. In this case the President was deciding which Societies got loans without regard to repayment record. The farmers reacted rationally to fears that they would not get another loan by withholding repayment of the one they had. Co-operative members would be encouraged to put pressure on those who did not repay if the money at risk included some of the members' savings. This force did not operate since nobody in the system had any motive for mobilizing savings. The bank Branch Managers were judged by their superiors on the extent to which they chased overdues and made returns on time. They were judged by the members on the way they expedited issue of loans.

There was almost no training of staff in techniques of banking and even less education and training for members. The supervisors who could have been giving guidance to primary

societies did not know much about Co-operation and were judged by criteria which made it more rewarding for them to write up defective primary society books themselves than to teach the people in the villages how to do it themselves.

It's a depressing picture, of which the outline must have beeen familiar to many before the book was written. Mr Ravindra Prasad fills in the details. Sometimes his description makes an appropriate remedy obvious. Sometimes he suggests remedies which are convincing as one reads of them. Unfortunately, as he also points out, there are strong vested interests against change. Studies like this can show the way to improvement but their ultimate value depends on whether there is also a will to follow it.

PETER YEO

Training in Public Administration: a Directory of Commonwealth Resources. *Commonwealth Secretariat, 1978.* index, appendix; £3.00.

It is only right that a journal with the name (in all senses of the phrase) of this one should notice such a compendium of overseas administrative relevance. Nor can it be a common experience in these inflationary days to be able to find 450 foolscap-size pages of useful information, impeccably printed and extensively indexed, at well under a penny a page.

Inaugurated, compiled and edited by the Commonwealth Programme for Applied Studies in Government of the Commonwealth Secretariat, the directory provides summary descriptions of the training, research, consultancy and publication activities of more than two hundred national, regional and international organizations active in public administration. The national organizations, relating to the resources of nearly forty Commonwealth countries, comprise the bulk of the book. Arranged in alphabetical order of country, it is possible to discover at a glance the name, address and telephone number of the institution, a brief description of its history and record in the field of public administration, extensive information on the specialized education and/or training courses it offers, and notes on the institution's research interests and projects, its experience in consultancy and, where applicable, its publication programme and its exchange arrangements. The same pattern is followed for the far smaller number of international and regional organizations, e.g. AAPAM, CAFRAD, East African Staff College. There are separate appendices on the role and resources of the Commonwealth Secretariat and the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation, and a valuable index of periodicals sponsored by the various institutions. The directory concludes with a 15-page general index, so that, for instance, it is easy to check which institutions offer foreign service training or which are the ones specializing in say, accounting management, rural development, development banking or industrial relations.

An omission of grave proportions is the total absence of an reference to the distinguished record or continuing programmes in public administration at the University of Ife.

Whoever is to blame, it is a lapse that cannot be allowed to mar the next updating of such an indispensable directory for all those involved in public administration training within the Commonwealth.

A. H. M. KIRK-GREENE

The Rulers of British Africa, 1870-1914; L H GANN and PETER DUIGNAN; *Croom Helm, London, 1978;* illustrated, appendices, index; pp 406; £11.95.

Once again the authors seek to place in a balanced perspective, the role of the British Administration in Africa during the era of Colonial rule and, indeed, during the half a century immediately preceding World War I, when British imperial power was at its height.

The volume makes excellent history. It is largely practical and is not be-deviled by any of the preconceived theories which tend to unbalance so much modern writing on Africa. They are writing of an era in which British statesmen and soldiers, administrators and entrepeneurs, and Livingstone-style missionaries as well, had in their arrogance, no doubts as to the right to colonize, the right of 'superiors' to rule and instruct their 'inferiors'. Only the unpaid celibates of the UMCA went like Bishop Lucas and his followers at Masasi to such 'cost-demanding' lengths as to live in African style huts subsisting on simple African food – on the avowed principle that their task was to bring the word of God to Africa, *not* to exploit Africa – even with vegetable gardens.

The number of British Civil and Military personnel in this period – outside South Africa – was very small indeed. Government depended on firmness, the personality of the administrators, on precept and knowledge, backed as needs be by arms of much superior quality to any possessed by any African tribesmen. The technique was to deal vigorously with dissent – snipping it in the bud where possible, and then for the victors to show a measure of magnanimity. There was never the theme of 'association' adopted by the French. Indeed, as the authors point out the British Establishment operated through a corps of gentlemen educated at a variety of Public Schools all catering solely for the middle and upper classes.

Change was taking place in Africa. Traditional societies which had been subjected to famine, war, invasion were now being affected by new techniques of farming and of trading – the latter accelerated by the coming of the Lebanese to West Africa, the Indian to East Africa. Colonial rule did not, as some now find it fashionable to say, turn the clock back. To the contrary the pace of forward-looking change was rapidly accelerated, bringing 'new opportunities as well as new forms of social bondage' – all of it, of course, sowing the seeds of the new nationalism that was with surprising speed to herald the decade of the transfer of power after World War II was over. The picture which the authors paint so well will not be readily accepted either by Marxist advocates in the West nor by many of the new

generation of African historians – nonetheless they have undoubtedly gone far towards putting the record straight, for those sufficiently percipient to see through the usual Shibboleths, the slick diagnosis of Africa's troubles – her past dependant status.

This is a book to be warmly commended to all Africanists; to all who teach African history both in Anglophone Africa and in Britain and the Americas.

PETER JOHNSTON

Native Administration in British Colonial Africa, introduced by A H M KIRK-GREENE; *Kraus Reprint, FL-9491 Nendeln, Liechtenstein,* Four Volumes, SFR 396.

So much is written sometimes justifiably yet often vitriolically, frequently in ignorance, and usually with prejudice, about British Administration in Africa, that the reprint of Lord Hailey's 'Native Administration in British African Territories' which first appeared in 1950-54 and with which this Journal was closely associated in its early days, is to be most warmly welcomed.

This veritable *magnum opus* has the benefit of Tony Kirk-Greene's introduction and includes a hitherto unpublished confidential report on Political Development in British Tropical Africa.

Lord Hailey was one of the great pro-consuls in India whose subsequent attention to British Dependencies in Africa provided the Colonial Office with a forward looking intellectual stimulus readily accepted by Andrew Cohen and others, and did much to lay the foundations for the coming transfer of power and its generally smooth and amicable accomplishment.

Lord Hailey had a clear penetrating mind and an astonishing memory for the facts and figures which came to his notice. This reviewer has never met anyone to whom he so instinctively felt that the truth was the only acceptable answer to a question, and ignorance, if that were the case was best admitted. It is greatly to be hoped that University departments dealing with administration and the political geography of Africa will add these volumes to their shelves; it is to be hoped too that African historians and other scholars will study these volumes and that this may result in a measure of academic reappraisal of the role of British Administration on the great continent of Africa.

PHJ

Book Notes

Underdeveloped Europe, DUDLEY SEERS, BERNARD SCHAFFER and MARJA LIISA KILJUNER (Eds); *The Harvester Press;* Tables, Appendix, Index; pp 325; £14.95.

Spain, Portugal, Southern Italy, Greece and Turkey on the Southern periphery of Europe are considered by the mostly IDS/Sussex contributors to this volume as they would consider the developing countries of the Third World – the poorer corners of an otherwise relatively affluent Europe – affluent that is compared with most of Africa and Asia, the Caribbean and Central America. Senor Penalosa watching a pre-view of Britain's official film prepared for the HABITAT conference at Vancouver commented to this reviewer 'but your poor look too rich' and no doubt many whom Professor Townsend would dub poor would rate a fairly high wealth rating in many a still developing country.

It is a pity that Raymond Crutty's paper focusing on cattle and capital in Ireland, should have recourse to such language as 'peripheralization'. Bernard Schaffer also writing on Ireland – in particular on the Shannon area, poses the question as to whether, if migration is not available, the institutionalized regional development of the area can really continue.

There are a number of interesting case studies – for some peculiar reason this section includes prosperous Scotland (prosperous despite increasing unemployment) where even the Highlands population has begun to rise again over the past five years.

The Modern Rise of Population, THOMAS MCKEOWN; *Edward Arnold;* index pp 168; £2.95.

Professor McKeown examines the population explosion in the West over the past 200 years mainly from the medical angle. He finds that until sulphonamides were introduced in 1935, the fall in the mortality rate could not be attributed to immunization or therapy – rather to general environmental improvements: improved hygiene, cleaner water, better sewage disposal etc, and in particular to better nutrition. That this well known and ably argued work is now available in inexpensive paperback shape is to be warmly welcomed.

Canada, Scandinavia and Southern Africa, D ANGLIN, T SHAW, and C WIDSTRAND (Eds); Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala; pp 190; SKr. 70.

The three editors are among the 15 contributors to this well produced volume – nine from Canada, five from Scandinavia, and one from London.

This book reports on the Scandinavian-Canadian Conference held in Ottawa early in 1978. The varied groups of writers had in common a deeply felt 'concern for the promotion of justice in Southern Africa'. Attention is drawn clearly to the approaching doom of the apartheid regime – hastened at last by the collapse of the Portuguese Empire, by the slow erosion of the Smith Regime in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, by the slow but real progress in Namibia; by the collective action of the Front Line States; by Commonwealth and UN actions could be added.

Already South Africa sees the writing on the wall and begins to modify some of the more outrageous racial policies – a Minister even lunches with African leaders in Soweto. All, alas, is probably too little too late to avoid the expected bloodshed that the death-throes of apartheid seems sure to bring.

Broadcasting in Japan, MASAMI ITO; *Routledge and Kegan Paul;* appendices; pp 125; £4.95.

The power of the news media has been enhanced immensely since the introduction of Television services.

This volume in remarkably few pages provides a full and clear picture of the whole broadcasting system of Japan, with Japanese expertise leading the world market in radio and TV sets, what is provided for home consumption, how organized and operated, should be of considerable interest to readers in all countries – irrespective of any particular 'stage' of development.

The Health Service of Ireland, BRENDAN HENSEY; *Institute of Public Administration, Dublin;* appendices, tables, bibliography, index; pp 276; £9.46.

Dr Hensey is Secretary to the Department of Health, Eire. He has been personally involved in all recent Health Legislation and no one is better qualified than he to write on this subject. This, the Third Edition, brings largely by way of new appendices up to date details of Irish Health Services, some twenty years after the author first wrote this extremely useful 'guide'.

Patterns of Diplomatic Thinking, LUC REYCHLER; *Praeger Special Studies;* Tables, bibliography, appendices, index; pp 295; £12.00.

Professor Reychler interviewed 266 diplomats from 116 countries to discover 'how they think'. He must have had fun. He must have been very patient. But the end product? Diplomats vary in every way and many are too diplomatic to vouchsafe to enquiring academics what they really think. Anyway do not most diplomats whatever they *do* think, invariably need in what they say to reflect the views of their Governments?

Professor Reychler has provided something new for the historical records, interesting no doubt, useful material for dialogue and discussion. Of value to anyone but a fellow academic must be questionable.

Printed in Wales for Her Majesty's Stationery Office by CSP Printing of Cardiff
Dd. 596247 K14 4/80

The Quarterly Journal of Administration

(The Quarterly Review of the Faculty of Administration, University of Ife, Ile Ife, Nigeria)

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The Editor
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ADMINISTRATION
Faculty of Administration
University of Ife
ILE—IFE, NIGERIA

ISBN 0 11 725552 1
ISSN 0021 - 8472